This saves 166 KiB for a tls.Dial hello world program (5382441 to
5212356 to bytes), by permitting the linker to remove TLS server code.
Change-Id: I16610b836bb0802b7d84995ff881d79ec03b6a84
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/228111
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
The cgo build tag is not necessary for root_darwin_arm64.go. We can't
build for darwin/arm64 without cgo, and even if we did 1) this code
would work fine 2) the no-cgo code that shells out to
/usr/bin/security would not work.
(Suggested by Filippo.)
Change-Id: I98cac2ea96ec5ac1ae60b7e32d195d5e86e2bd66
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/227583
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This removes all conditions and conditional code (that I could find)
that depended on darwin/arm.
Fixes#35439 (since that only happened on darwin/arm)
Fixes#37611.
Change-Id: Ia4c32a5a4368ed75231075832b0b5bfb1ad11986
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/227198
Run-TryBot: Austin Clements <austin@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Zhang <cherryyz@google.com>
This removes all files that are only used on darwin/arm and cleans up
build tags in files that are still used on other platforms.
Updates #37611.
Change-Id: Ic9490cf0edfc157c6276a7ca950c1768b34a998f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/227197
Run-TryBot: Austin Clements <austin@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Zhang <cherryyz@google.com>
Cleaned up for readability and consistency.
There is one tiny behavioral change: when PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash is
used and both hash and opts.Hash were set, hash.Size() was used for the
salt length instead of opts.Hash.Size(). That's clearly wrong because
opts.Hash is documented to override hash.
Change-Id: I3e25dad933961eac827c6d2e3bbfe45fc5a6fb0e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/226937
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Per RFC 8017, reject signatures which are not the same length as the RSA
modulus. This matches the behavior of SignPKCS1v15 which properly left pads
the signatures it generates to the size of the modulus.
Fixes#21896
Change-Id: I2c42a0b24cf7fff158ece604b6f0c521a856d932
GitHub-Last-Rev: 6040f79906
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#38140
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/226203
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
This makes all modern public keys in the standard library implement a
common interface (below) that can be used by applications for better
type safety and allows for checking that public (and private keys via
Public()) are equivalent.
interface {
Equal(crypto.PublicKey) bool
}
Equality for ECDSA keys is complicated, we take a strict interpretation
that works for all secure applications (the ones not using the
unfortunate non-constant time CurveParams implementation) and fails
closed otherwise.
Tests in separate files to make them x_tests and avoid an import loop
with crypto/x509.
Re-landing of CL 223754. Dropped the test that was assuming named curves
are not implemented by CurveParams, because it's not true for all
curves, and anyway is not a property we need to test. There is still a
test to check that different curves make keys not Equal.
Fixes#21704Fixes#38035
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/223754
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Change-Id: I736759b145bfb4f7f8eecd78c324315d5a05385c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/225460
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
This reverts CL 223754.
Reason for revert: new tests are failing on all longtest builders.
Change-Id: I2257d106c132f3a02c0af6b20061d4f9a8093c4f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/225077
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
This makes all modern public keys in the standard library implement a
common interface (below) that can be used by applications for better
type safety and allows for checking that public (and private keys via
Public()) are equivalent.
interface {
Equal(crypto.PublicKey) bool
}
Equality for ECDSA keys is complicated, we take a strict interpretation
that works for all secure applications (the ones not using the
unfortunate non-constant time CurveParams implementation) and fails
closed otherwise.
Tests in separate files to make them x_tests and avoid an import loop
with crypto/x509.
Fixes#21704
Change-Id: Id5379c96384a11c5afde0614955360e7470bb1c4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/223754
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
The existing Certificate.CreateCRL method generates non-conformant CRLs and
as such cannot be used for implementations that require standards
compliance. This change implements a new top level method, CreateCRL, which
generates compliant CRLs, and offers an extensible API if any
extensions/fields need to be supported in the future.
Here is an example Issuer/CRL generated using this change:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIBNjCB3aADAgECAgEWMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMBIxEDAOBgNVBAMTB3Rlc3Rpbmcw
IhgPMDAwMTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8wMDAxMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMH
dGVzdGluZzBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABLHrudbSM36sn1VBrmm/
OfQTyEsI4tIUV1VmneOKHL9ENBGCiec4GhQm2SGnDT/sZy2bB3c3yozh/roS6cZJ
UZqjIDAeMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBAjAMBgNVHQ4EBQQDAQIDMAoGCCqGSM49BAMC
A0gAMEUCIQCoAYN6CGZPgd5Sw5a1rd5VexciT5MCxTfXj+ZfJNfoiAIgQVCTB8AE
Nm2xset7+HOgtQYlKNw/rGd8cFcv5Y9aUzo=
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
MIHWMH0CAQEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwEjEQMA4GA1UEAxMHdGVzdGluZxgPMDAwMTAx
MDIwMDAwMDBaGA8wMDAxMDEwMzAwMDAwMFowFjAUAgECGA8wMDAxMDEwMTAxMDAw
MFqgHjAcMA4GA1UdIwQHMAWAAwECAzAKBgNVHRQEAwIBBTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJ
ADBGAiEAjqfj/IG4ys5WkjrbTNpDbr+saHGO/NujLJotlLL9KzgCIQDm8VZPzj0f
NYEQgAW4nsiUzlvEUCoHMw0141VCZXv67A==
-----END X509 CRL-----
Fixes#35428
Change-Id: Id96b6f47698d0bed39d586b46bd12374ee6ff88f
GitHub-Last-Rev: c83a601716
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#36945
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/217298
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
The minimum macOS supported version is 10.11 as of Go 1.14, see #23011.
Thus, bump macosx-version-min to 10.11
While at it, drop __MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED as suggested by
Filippo:
In general, I can see why we'd want to tell the libraries which
minimum version we target so they drop compatibility with older
versions. No idea why we'd specify a max version, unless it's to make
sure we don't use APIs added after that version, but then it would
have to be 1011 not 1015.
Let's try dropping that define and see if anything blows up? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
Change-Id: I6b76623a9404724ccda40311ff95b3475ae8a60c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/214059
Run-TryBot: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Changing "man-in-the-middle" references to "machine-in-the-middle",
it's a more inclusive term and still aligns with the MITM acronym.
Change-Id: I81f954cff3d252433443f159ff9edaf59a28ab9d
GitHub-Last-Rev: 3e8f91424a
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#37918
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/223897
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This CL changes some unit test functions, making sure that these tests (and goroutines spawned during test) won't block.
Since they are just test functions, I use one CL to fix them all. I hope this won't cause trouble to reviewers and can save time for us.
There are three main categories of incorrect logic fixed by this CL:
1. Use testing.Fatal()/Fatalf() in spawned goroutines, which is forbidden by Go's document.
2. Channels are used in such a way that, when errors or timeout happen, the test will be blocked and never return.
3. Channels are used in such a way that, when errors or timeout happen, the test can return but some spawned goroutines will be leaked, occupying resource until all other tests return and the process is killed.
Change-Id: I3df931ec380794a0cf1404e632c1dd57c65d63e8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/219380
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
"SSL_CERT_DIR" is meant to hold more than one directory, when a colon
is used as a delimiter. However, we assumed it'd be a single directory
for all root certificates.
OpenSSL and BoringSSL properly respected the colon separated
"SSL_CERT_DIR", as per:
* OpenSSL 12a765a523/crypto/x509/by_dir.c (L153-L209)
* BoringSSL 3ba9586bc0/crypto/x509/by_dir.c (L194-L247)
This change adds that parity to loadSystemRoots.
RELNOTE=yes
Fixes#35325
Change-Id: I0d554a00ccc34300a7f0529aa741ee7e2d5762f9
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205237
Run-TryBot: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
When run as a separate program, the code in ExampleDial panicked due to
an expired certificate. Fixed this problem by replacing the expired
certificate with a valid one.
Also added a comment in the certificate to give a hint about why it
might fail in the future.
Fixes#35706
Change-Id: I3d300f7bccae050e4b73ded28b8029aa04b480bd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/212601
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This CL should not change the logic at all, but it took me a while to
figure out why we use these specific SignatureSchemes, so reformulate
the comment.
Change-Id: If519a58264209e6575417be07668e92ead0e772f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/208225
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Update the Example in the crypto/ecdsa package for signing
and verifying signatures to use these new functions.
This also changes (*PrivateKey).Sign to use
x/crypto/cryptobyte/asn1 instead of encoding/asn1
to marshal the signature.
Fixes#20544
Change-Id: I3423cfc4d7f9e1748fbed5a631438c8a3b280df4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/217940
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
The error message for trailing data after the X.509 issuer should
correctly state "issuer" instead of "subject", which appears just above
this code.
Fixes#35841
Change-Id: Iea2605ce97f2b084eb78e88f2c27d7d43749d022
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/208978
Run-TryBot: Alexander Rakoczy <alex@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422#appendix-A for a helpful table.
Also, commit to keeping them singletons, as that assumption is already
made all over the place in the ecosystem.
Fixes#34193
Change-Id: I2ec50fa18bb80e11d6101f2562df60b5e27d4f66
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/218921
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
An attacker can trick the Windows system verifier to use a poisoned set
of elliptic curve parameters for a trusted root, allowing it to generate
spoofed signatures. When this happens, the returned chain will present
the unmodified original root, so the actual signatures won't verify (as
they are invalid for the correct parameters). Simply double check them
as a safety measure and mitigation.
Windows users should still install the system security patch ASAP.
This is the same mitigation adopted by Chromium:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1994434
Change-Id: I2c734f6fb2cb51d906c7fd77034318ffeeb3e146
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/215905
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
I noticed this leak while writing CL 214977.
Change-Id: I7566952b8e4bc58939d23435aea86576fc58ddca
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/214978
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
After golang.org/cl/210124, I wondered if the same error had gone
unnoticed elsewhere. I quickly spotted another dozen mistakes after
reading through the output of:
git grep '\<[Aa]n [bcdfgjklmnpqrtvwyz][a-z]'
Many results are false positives for acronyms like "an mtime", since
it's pronounced "an em-time". However, the total amount of output isn't
that large given how simple the grep pattern is.
Change-Id: Iaa2ca69e42f4587a9e3137d6c5ed758887906ca6
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/210678
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Zach Jones <zachj1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
The cipher suites were apparently renamed late in the standardization
process, and we picked up the legacy name. We can't remove the old
constants, but add correctly named ones.
Fixes#32061
Change-Id: I65ee25c12c10934391af88b76b18565da67453fa
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205068
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TLS 1.3, which requires RSA-PSS, is now enabled without a GODEBUG
opt-out, and with the introduction of
Certificate.SupportedSignatureAlgorithms (#28660) there is a
programmatic way to avoid RSA-PSS (disable TLS 1.3 with MaxVersion and
use that field to specify only PKCS#1 v1.5 SignatureSchemes).
This effectively reverts 0b3a57b537,
although following CL 205061 all of the signing-side logic is
conveniently centralized in signatureSchemesForCertificate.
Fixes#32425
Change-Id: I7c9a8893bb5d518d86eae7db82612b9b2cd257d7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205063
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
This will let applications stop crypto/tls from using a certificate key
with an algorithm that is not supported by its crypto.Signer, like
hardware backed keys that can't do RSA-PSS.
Fixes#28660
Change-Id: I294cc06bddf813fff35c5107540c4a1788e1dace
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205062
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Now that we have a full implementation of the logic to check certificate
compatibility, we can let applications just list multiple chains in
Certificates (for example, an RSA and an ECDSA one) and choose the most
appropriate automatically.
NameToCertificate only maps each name to one chain, so simply deprecate
it, and while at it simplify its implementation by not stripping
trailing dots from the SNI (which is specified not to have any, see RFC
6066, Section 3) and by not supporting multi-level wildcards, which are
not a thing in the WebPKI (and in crypto/x509).
The performance of SupportsCertificate without Leaf is poor, but doesn't
affect current users. For now document that, and address it properly in
the next cycle. See #35504.
While cleaning up the Certificates/GetCertificate/GetConfigForClient
behavior, also support leaving Certificates/GetCertificate nil if
GetConfigForClient is set, and send unrecognized_name when there are no
available certificates.
Fixes#29139Fixes#18377
Change-Id: I26604db48806fe4d608388e55da52f34b7ca4566
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205059
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
Also, add Version to CertificateRequestInfo, as the semantics of
SignatureSchemes change based on version: the ECDSA SignatureSchemes are
only constrained to a specific curve in TLS 1.3.
Fixes#32426
Change-Id: I7a551bea864799e98118349ac2476162893d1ffd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205058
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
We'll also use this function for a better selection logic from
Config.Certificates in a later CL.
Updates #32426
Change-Id: Ie239574d02eb7fd2cf025ec36721c8c7e082d0bc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205057
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
This refactors a lot of the certificate support logic to make it cleaner
and reusable where possible. These changes will make the following CLs
much simpler.
In particular, the heavily overloaded pickSignatureAlgorithm is gone.
That function used to cover both signing and verifying side, would work
both for pre-signature_algorithms TLS 1.0/1.1 and TLS 1.2, and returned
sigalg, type and hash.
Now, TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 are differentiated at the caller, as they have
effectively completely different logic. TLS 1.0/1.1 simply use
legacyTypeAndHashFromPublicKey as they employ a fixed hash function and
signature algorithm for each public key type. TLS 1.2 is instead routed
through selectSignatureScheme (on the signing side) or
isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm (on the verifying side) and
typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme, like TLS 1.3.
On the signing side, signatureSchemesForCertificate was already version
aware (for PKCS#1 v1.5 vs PSS support), so selectSignatureScheme just
had to learn the Section 7.4.1.4.1 defaults for a missing
signature_algorithms to replace pickSignatureAlgorithm.
On the verifying side, pickSignatureAlgorithm was also checking the
public key type, while isSupportedSignatureAlgorithm +
typeAndHashFromSignatureScheme are not, but that check was redundant
with the one in verifyHandshakeSignature.
There should be no major change in behavior so far. A few minor changes
came from the refactor: we now correctly require signature_algorithms in
TLS 1.3 when using a certificate; we won't use Ed25519 in TLS 1.2 if the
client didn't send signature_algorithms; and we don't send
ec_points_format in the ServerHello (a compatibility measure) if we are
not doing ECDHE anyway because there are no mutually supported curves.
The tests also got simpler because they test simpler functions. The
caller logic switching between TLS 1.0/1.1 and 1.2 is tested by the
transcript tests.
Updates #32426
Change-Id: Ice9dcaea78d204718f661f8d60efdb408ba41577
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205061
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
This makes Ed25519 certificates work for CreateCRL(). This previously
failed (panic: crypto: requested hash function #0 is unavailable) because
the hash could not be skipped, but Ed25519 uses no hash.
A similar fix has been applied in a few other places when Ed25519 was added
when Ed25519 certificates were originally introduced, but was missed
here.
Change-Id: I16fcfcd53ba3bb8f773e5de972b8fedde1f6350e
Change-Id: I16fcfcd53ba3bb8f773e5de972b8fedde1f6350e
GitHub-Last-Rev: bf7f1458f8
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#35241
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/204046
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Setting InsecureSkipVerify and VerifyPeerCertificate is the recommended
way to customize and override certificate validation.
However, there is boilerplate involved and it usually requires first
reimplementing the default validation strategy to then customize it.
Provide an example that does the same thing as the default as a starting
point.
Examples of where we directed users to do something similar are in
issues #35467, #31791, #28754, #21971, and #24151.
Fixes#31792
Change-Id: Id033e9fa3cac9dff1f7be05c72dfb34b4f973fd4
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/193620
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
dsa.Verify might currently use a nil s inverse in a
multiplication if the public key contains a non-prime Q,
causing a panic. Change this to check that the mod
inverse exists before using it.
Fixes CVE-2019-17596
Fixes#34960
Change-Id: I94d5f3cc38f1b5d52d38dcb1d253c71b7fd1cae7
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/golang/go-private/+/572809
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <valsorda@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/205441
Run-TryBot: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Replace
buf := [HUGE_CONST]*T)(unsafe.Pointer(p))[:]
with
buf := [HUGE_CONST]*T)(unsafe.Pointer(p))[:n:n]
Pointer p points to n of T elements. New unsafe pointer conversion
logic verifies that both first and last elements point into the
same Go variable. And this change adjusts all code to comply with
this rule.
Verified by running
go test -a -short -gcflags=all=-d=checkptr crypto/x509
The test does not fail even with original version of this code. I
suspect it is because all variables I changed live outside of Go
memory. But I am just guessing, I don't really know how pointer
checker works.
Updates golang/go#34972
Change-Id: Ibc33fdc9e2023d9b14905c9badf2f0b683999ab8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/204621
Run-TryBot: Alex Brainman <alex.brainman@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Even though bitwise operations may be slightly more
performant, the readability improvement of a mod
operation is worth the tradeoff.
Change-Id: I352c92ad355c6eb6ef99e3da00e1eff2d2ea5812
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/204739
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Follow the recommandation from RFC 8422, section 5.1.2 of sending back the
ec_points_format extension when requested by the client. This is to fix
some clients declining the handshake if omitted.
Fixes#31943
Change-Id: I7b04dbac6f9af75cda094073defe081e1e9a295d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/176418
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Olivier Poitrey <rs@rhapsodyk.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Also, fix the alert value sent when a signature by a client certificate
is invalid in TLS 1.0-1.2.
Fixes#35190
Change-Id: I2ae1d5593dfd5ee2b4d979664aec74aab4a8a704
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/204157
Reviewed-by: Katie Hockman <katie@golang.org>
As suggested by comments from the review of CL 168478, this adds
Go code to do reverse bytes and removes the asm code, as well
as making a few cosmetic changes.
Change-Id: I08276a11222e03c3b42f4c9dc0d10a371a418be7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/203937
Run-TryBot: Lynn Boger <laboger@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
This adds an asm implementation of the p256 functions used
in crypto/elliptic, utilizing VMX, VSX to improve performance.
On a power9 the improvement is:
elliptic benchmarks:
name old time/op new time/op delta
BaseMult 1.40ms ± 0% 1.44ms ± 0% +2.66% (p=0.029 n=4+4)
BaseMultP256 317µs ± 0% 50µs ± 0% -84.14% (p=0.029 n=4+4)
ScalarMultP256 854µs ± 2% 214µs ± 0% -74.91% (p=0.029 n=4+4)
ecdsa benchmarks:
name old time/op new time/op delta
SignP256 377µs ± 0% 111µs ± 0% -70.57% (p=0.029 n=4+4)
SignP384 6.55ms ± 0% 6.48ms ± 0% -1.03% (p=0.029 n=4+4)
VerifyP256 1.19ms ± 0% 0.26ms ± 0% -78.54% (p=0.029 n=4+4)
KeyGeneration 319µs ± 0% 52µs ± 0% -83.56% (p=0.029 n=4+4)
This implemenation is based on the s390x implementation, using
comparable instructions for most with some minor changes where the
instructions are not quite the same.
Some changes were also needed since s390x is big endian and ppc64le
is little endian.
This also enables the fuzz_test for ppc64le.
Change-Id: I59a69515703b82ad2929f68ba2f11208fa833181
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/168478
Run-TryBot: Lynn Boger <laboger@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
localPipe currently flakes in various crypto/tls tests. Since that
function doesn't seem to flake anywhere else, I suspect a kernel bug.
To make the test less flaky, retry the Dial if we suspect that it is
affected. (Worst case, we delay the test by a few seconds before
erroring out as usual.)
Fixes#29583
Change-Id: I357990ffa316edb471bd7d46d6404fa0884da646
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/202557
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
This a revert of CL 174437 and follow up fix CL 201317.
The s390x assembly in this package makes use of an instruction
(specifically KDSA) which is not supported by the current build
machine. Remove this assembly for now, we can revisit this
functionality once we have a newer build machine and can ensure
that this assembly is well tested.
Updates #34927.
Change-Id: I779286fa7d9530a254b53a515ee76b1218821f2f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/201360
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
I used too small a size for buffers, which can cause a panic in some testing.
The new buffer size is generous and sufficient for all purposes.
Fixes#34927Fixes#34928
Change-Id: Icdbbfed5da87fe3757be40dfd23182b37ec62d58
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/201317
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
We should keep a consistent way of formatting errors
in this file.
Fixes#34848
Change-Id: Ibb75908504f381fccab0281a42e788ef8c716b6f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/200679
Run-TryBot: Johan Brandhorst <johan.brandhorst@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
Part 1: CL 199499 (GOOS nacl)
Part 2: CL 200077 (amd64p32 files, toolchain)
Part 3: stuff that arguably should've been part of Part 2, but I forgot
one of my grep patterns when splitting the original CL up into
two parts.
This one might also have interesting stuff to resurrect for any future
x32 ABI support.
Updates #30439
Change-Id: I2b4143374a253a003666f3c69e776b7e456bdb9c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/200318
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
This is part two if the nacl removal. Part 1 was CL 199499.
This CL removes amd64p32 support, which might be useful in the future
if we implement the x32 ABI. It also removes the nacl bits in the
toolchain, and some remaining nacl bits.
Updates #30439
Change-Id: I2475d5bb066d1b474e00e40d95b520e7c2e286e1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/200077
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
You were a useful port and you've served your purpose.
Thanks for all the play.
A subsequent CL will remove amd64p32 (including assembly files and
toolchain bits) and remaining bits. The amd64p32 removal will be
separated into its own CL in case we want to support the Linux x32 ABI
in the future and want our old amd64p32 support as a starting point.
Updates #30439
Change-Id: Ia3a0c7d49804adc87bf52a4dea7e3d3007f2b1cd
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/199499
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
According to spec, the hash must be truncated, but crypto/dsa
does not do it. We can't fix it in crypto/dsa, because it would break
verification of previously generated signatures.
In crypto/x509 however, go can't generate DSA certs, only verify them,
so the fix here should be safe.
Fixes#22017
Change-Id: Iee7e20a5d76f45da8901a7ca686063639092949f
GitHub-Last-Rev: 8041cde8d2
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#34630
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/198138
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Because errors like:
certificate has expired or is not yet valid
make it difficult to distinguish between "certificate has expired" and
"my local clock is skewed". Including our idea of the local time
makes it easier to identify the clock-skew case, and including the
violated certificate constraint saves folks the trouble of looking it
up in the target certificate.
Change-Id: I52e0e71705ee36f6afde1bb5a47b9b42ed5ead5b
GitHub-Last-Rev: db2ca4029c
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#34646
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/198046
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Currently if type of public key is unsupported, error message is "only
RSA and ECDSA public keys supported". After adding Ed25519 this message
is no longer correct.
Moreover, it is superfluous because documentation for
MarshalPKIXPublicKey, CreateCertificateRequest and CreateCertificate
already lists supported public key types.
This CL removes unnecessary details from error message.
It also adds reporting the type of unsupported key, which helps
debugging cases when struct (instead of a pointer) to otherwise correct
public key is given.
Fixes#32640
Change-Id: I45e6e3d756b543688d850009b4da8a4023c05027
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/196777
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Use the following (suboptimal) script to obtain a list of possible
typos:
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -x
git ls-files |\
grep -e '\.\(c\|cc\|go\)$' |\
xargs -n 1\
awk\
'/\/\// { gsub(/.*\/\//, ""); print; } /\/\*/, /\*\// { gsub(/.*\/\*/, ""); gsub(/\*\/.*/, ""); }' |\
hunspell -d en_US -l |\
grep '^[[:upper:]]\{0,1\}[[:lower:]]\{1,\}$' |\
grep -v -e '^.\{1,4\}$' -e '^.\{16,\}$' |\
sort -f |\
uniq -c |\
awk '$1 == 1 { print $2; }'
Then, go through the results manually and fix the most obvious typos in
the non-vendored code.
Change-Id: I3cb5830a176850e1a0584b8a40b47bde7b260eae
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/193848
Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@golang.org>
The exception allowed a specific intermediate [1] to chain up to a
broken root that lacked the CA:TRUE X509v3 Basic Constraint.
The broken root [2] is expiring at the end of 2019, so we can remove the
exception in Go 1.14.
Moreover, there is a reissued version of that root [3] (same Subject and
SPKI, valid CA) which expires in 2029, so root stores should have
migrated to it already, making the exception unnecessary.
[1]: https://crt.sh/?caid=57
[2]: https://crt.sh/?id=1616049
[3]: https://crt.sh/?id=55
Change-Id: I43f51100982791b0e8bac90d143b60851cd46dfc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/193038
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The current implementation panics on nil certificates,
so introduce a nil check and early return true if both
are nil, false if only one is.
Fixes#28743
Change-Id: I71b0dee3e505d3ad562a4470ccc22c3a2579bc52
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/167118
Run-TryBot: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
Include references in the package-level comment block, expand
the obscure IRO acronym, and add a reference for "the standard
(cryptographic) assumptions".
Fixes#33589
Change-Id: I76c3b0a2f7258b3ab4bf1c8e7681c5d159720a20
GitHub-Last-Rev: 30d5a1e2fb
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#33723
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/190840
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
SSLv3 has been irreparably broken since the POODLE attack 5 years ago
and RFC 7568 (f.k.a. draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie) prohibits its use
in no uncertain terms.
As announced in the Go 1.13 release notes, remove support for it
entirely in Go 1.14.
Updates #32716
Change-Id: Id653557961d8f75f484a01e6afd2e104a4ccceaf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/191976
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Session resumption is not a reliable TLS behavior: the server can decide
to reject a session ticket for a number of reasons, or no reason at all.
This makes this non-hermetic test extremely brittle.
It's currently broken on the builders for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, and
I could reproduce the issue for TLS 1.3 only. As I was debugging it, it
started passing entirely on my machine.
In practice, it doesn't get us any coverage as resumption is already
tested with the recorded exchange tests, and TestVerifyHostname still
provides a smoke test checking that we can in fact talk TLS.
Fixes#32978
Change-Id: I63505e22ff7704f25ad700d46e4ff14850ba5d3c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/186239
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
The localPipe implementation assumes that every successful net.Dial
results in exactly one successful listener.Accept. I don't believe this
is guaranteed by essentially any operating system. For this test, we're
seeing flakes on dragonfly (#29583).
But see also #19519, flakes due to the same assumption on FreeBSD
and macOS in package net's own tests.
This CL rewrites localPipe to try a few times to get a matching pair
of connections on the dial and accept side.
Fixes#29583.
Change-Id: Idb045b18c404eae457f091df20456c5ae879a291
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/184157
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
The RFC recommends checking the X25519 output to ensure it's not the
zero value, to guard against peers trying to remove contributory
behavior.
In TLS there should be enough transcript involvement to mitigate any
attack, and the RSA key exchange would suffer from the same issues by
design, so not proposing a backport.
See #31846
Change-Id: I8e657f8ee8aa72c3f8ca3b124555202638c53f5e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/183039
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Removed cross-dependencies between handshake_server_test.go and
handshake_client_test.go; moved all initialization to TestMain; replaced
SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable with -keylog flag.
Change-Id: Ida6712daa44e01a2c00658e8a1896087ee88bcb0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/183057
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Signing with RSA-PSS can uncover faulty crypto.Signer implementations,
and it can fail for (broken) small keys. We'll have to take that
breakage eventually, but it would be nice for it to be opt-out at first.
TLS 1.3 requires RSA-PSS and is opt-out in Go 1.13. Instead of making a
TLS 1.3 opt-out influence a TLS 1.2 behavior, let's wait to add RSA-PSS
to TLS 1.2 until TLS 1.3 is on without opt-out.
Note that since the Client Hello is sent before a protocol version is
selected, we have to advertise RSA-PSS there to support TLS 1.3.
That means that we still support RSA-PSS on the client in TLS 1.2 for
verifying server certificates, which is fine, as all issues arise on the
signing side. We have to be careful not to pick (or consider available)
RSA-PSS on the client for client certificates, though.
We'd expect tests to change only in TLS 1.2:
* the server won't pick PSS to sign the key exchange
(Server-TLSv12-* w/ RSA, TestHandshakeServerRSAPSS);
* the server won't advertise PSS in CertificateRequest
(Server-TLSv12-ClientAuthRequested*, TestClientAuth);
* and the client won't pick PSS for its CertificateVerify
(Client-TLSv12-ClientCert-RSA-*, TestHandshakeClientCertRSAPSS,
Client-TLSv12-Renegotiate* because "R" requests a client cert).
Client-TLSv13-ClientCert-RSA-RSAPSS was updated because of a fix in the test.
This effectively reverts 8834353072.
Testing was made more complex by the undocumented semantics of OpenSSL's
-[client_]sigalgs (see openssl/openssl#9172).
Updates #32425
Change-Id: Iaddeb2df1f5c75cd090cc8321df2ac8e8e7db349
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/182339
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The typed arrays returned by TypedArrayOf were backed by WebAssembly
memory. They became invalid each time we grow the WebAssembly memory.
This made them very error prone and hard to use correctly.
This change removes TypedArrayOf completely and instead introduces
CopyBytesToGo and CopyBytesToJS for copying bytes between a byte
slice and an Uint8Array. This breaking change is still allowed for
the syscall/js package.
Fixes#31980.
Fixes#31812.
Change-Id: I14c76fdd60b48dd517c1593972a56d04965cb272
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177537
Run-TryBot: Richard Musiol <neelance@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Zhang <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Utilize KDSA when available. This guarantees constant time operation on all three curves mentioned,
and is faster than conventional assembly. The IBM Z model(s) that support KDSA as used in this CL
are not yet publicly available, and so we are unable to release performance data at this time.
Change-Id: I85360dcf90fe42d2bf32afe3f638e282de10a518
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/174437
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
To a fifth reading of the relevant docs, it looks like
1) a constraint dictionary with no policy applies to all of them;
2) multiple applying constraint dictionaries should have their results OR'd;
3) untrusted certificates in the keychain should be used for chain building.
This fixes 1), approximates 2) and punts on 3).
Fixes#30672Fixes#30471
Change-Id: Ibbaabf0b77d267377c0b5de07abca3445c2c2302
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/178539
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Note how untrustedData is never NULL, so loadSystemRoots was checking
the wrong thing.
Also, renamed the C function to CopyPEMRoots to follow the
CoreFoundation naming convention on ownership.
Finally, redirect all debug output to standard error.
Change-Id: Ie80abefadf8974a75c0646aa02fcfcebcbe3bde8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/178538
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Shorten some of the longest tests that run during all.bash.
Removes 7r 50u 21s from all.bash.
After this change, all.bash is under 5 minutes again on my laptop.
For #26473.
Change-Id: Ie0460aa935808d65460408feaed210fbaa1d5d79
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177559
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Gerrit is complaining about pushes that affect these files
and forcing people to use -o nokeycheck, which defeats
the point of the check. Hide the keys from this kind of scan
by marking them explicitly as testing keys.
This is a little annoying but better than training everyone
who ever edits one of these test files to reflexively override
the Gerrit check.
The only remaining keys explicitly marked as private instead
of testing are in examples, and there's not much to do
about those. Hopefully they are not edited as much.
Change-Id: I4431592b5266cb39fe6a80b40e742d97da803a0b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/178178
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
In TLS 1.3 session tickets are delivered after the handshake, and it
looks like now the Google servers wait until the first flight of data to
send them (or our timeout is too low). Cause some data to be sent so we
can avoid the guessing game.
Fixes#32090
Change-Id: I54af4acb3a89cc70c9e14a5dfe18a44c29a841a7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177877
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Support for Ed25519 certificates was added in CL 175478, this wires them
up into the TLS stack according to RFC 8422 (TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3).
RFC 8422 also specifies support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1, and I initially
implemented that, but even OpenSSL doesn't take the complexity, so I
just dropped it. It would have required keeping a buffer of the
handshake transcript in order to do the direct Ed25519 signatures. We
effectively need to support TLS 1.2 because it shares ClientHello
signature algorithms with TLS 1.3.
While at it, reordered the advertised signature algorithms in the rough
order we would want to use them, also based on what curves have fast
constant-time implementations.
Client and client auth tests changed because of the change in advertised
signature algorithms in ClientHello and CertificateRequest.
Fixes#25355
Change-Id: I9fdd839afde4fd6b13fcbc5cc7017fd8c35085ee
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177698
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Working toward making the tree vet-safe instead of having
so many exceptions in cmd/vet/all/whitelist.
This CL makes "go vet -unsafeptr=false runtime" happy for windows/*,
while keeping "GO_BUILDER_NAME=misc-vetall go tool dist test" happy too.
For #31916.
Change-Id: If37ab2b3f6fca4696b8a6afb2ef11ba6c4fb42e0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/176106
Reviewed-by: Austin Clements <austin@google.com>
The crypto/tls and crypto/x509 APIs leak PublicKey and PrivateKey types,
so in order to add support for Ed25519 certificates we need the ed25519
package in the stdlib.
It's also a primitive that's reasonable to use directly in applications,
as it is a modern, safe and fast signing algorithm, for which there
aren't higher level APIs. (The nacl/sign API is limiting in that it
repeats the message.)
A few docs changes will come in a follow-up, and a CL will land on
golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519 to make it a type alias wrapper on Go 1.13+.
Updates #25355
Change-Id: I057f20cc7d1aca2b95c29ce73eb03c3b237e413f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/174945
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Most changes are removing redundant declaration of type when direct
instantiating value of map or slice, e.g. []T{T{}} become []T{{}}.
Small changes are removing the high order of subslice if its value
is the length of slice itself, e.g. T[:len(T)] become T[:].
The following file is excluded due to incompatibility with go1.4,
- src/cmd/compile/internal/gc/ssa.go
Change-Id: Id3abb09401795ce1e6da591a89749cba8502fb26
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/166437
Run-TryBot: Dave Cheney <dave@cheney.net>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
I recently modified tabwriter to reduce the number of defers due to
flush calls. However, I forgot to notice that the new function
flushNoDefers can no longer return an error, due to the lack of the
defer.
In crypto/tls, hashForServerKeyExchange never returned a non-nil error,
so simplify the code.
Finally, in go/types and net we can find a few trivially unused
parameters, so remove them.
Change-Id: I54c8de83fbc944df432453b55c93008d7e810e61
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/174131
Run-TryBot: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Benny Siegert <bsiegert@gmail.com>
The CBC mode ciphers in TLS are a disaster. By ordering authentication
and encryption wrong, they are very subtly dependent on details and
implementation of the padding check, admitting attacks such as POODLE
and Lucky13.
crypto/tls does not promise full countermeasures for Lucky13 and still
contains some timing variations. This change fixes one of the easy ones:
by checking the MAC, then the padding, rather than all at once, there is
a very small timing variation between bad MAC and (good MAC, bad
padding).
The consequences depend on the effective padding value used in the MAC
when the padding is bad. extractPadding simply uses the last byte's
value, leaving the padding bytes effectively unchecked. This is the
scenario in SSL 3.0 that led to POODLE. Specifically, the attacker can
take an input record which uses 16 bytes of padding (a full block) and
replace the final block with some interesting block. The MAC check will
succeed with 1/256 probability due to the final byte being 16. This
again means that after 256 queries, the attacker can decrypt one byte.
To fix this, bitwise AND the two values so they may be checked with one
branch. Additionally, zero the padding if the padding check failed, to
make things more robust.
Updates #27071
Change-Id: I332b14d215078928ffafe3cfeba1a68189f08db3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/170701
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
The certificates argument to verifyServerCertificate must contain
at least one certificate. Simplify the intermediate certificate
handling code accordingly.
Change-Id: I8292cdfb51f418e011d6d97f47d10b4e631aa932
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/169657
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
The first biggest offender was crypto/des.init at ~1%. It's
cryptographically broken and the init function is relatively expensive,
which is unfortunate as both crypto/tls and crypto/x509 (and by
extension, cmd/go) import it. Hide the work behind sync.Once.
The second biggest offender was flag.sortFlags at just under 1%, used by
the Visit flagset methods. It allocated two slices, which made a
difference as cmd/go iterates over multiple flagsets during init.
Use a single slice with a direct sort.Interface implementation.
Another big offender is initializing global maps. Reducing this work in
cmd/go/internal/imports and net/textproto gives us close to another
whole 1% in saved work. The former can use map literals, and the latter
can hide the work behind sync.Once.
Finally, compress/flate used newHuffmanBitWriter as part of init, which
allocates many objects and slices. Yet it only used one of the slice
fields. Allocating just that slice saves a surprising ~0.3%, since we
generated a lot of unnecessary garbage.
All in all, these little pieces amount to just over 3% saved CPU time.
name old time/op new time/op delta
ExecGoEnv-8 3.61ms ± 1% 3.50ms ± 0% -3.02% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Updates #26775.
Updates #29382.
Change-Id: I915416e88a874c63235ba512617c8aef35c0ca8b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/166459
Run-TryBot: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Alpine Linux uses /etc/ssl/cert.pem as default ca-bundle which
is preinstalled since 3.7 and was installed as part of the libressl
package in 3.5 and 3.6.
The path /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt is only valid if the full
ca-certificates package is installed by hand, which contains all
single CA certs and uses update-ca-certificates to bundle them.
The priority for /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt should be kept
higher than /etc/ssl/cert.pem in case the user installed custom
CA certs.
Change-Id: I1c86a6ad84d8ee1163560655743a5ce9f2408af1
GitHub-Last-Rev: 0ba4d599e4
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#31042
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/169238
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Standard output is reserved for actual program output.
Debug print should be limited in general (here they are
enabled by an environment variable) and always go to
standard error.
Came across by accident.
Change-Id: I1490be71473520f049719572b3acaa0ea9f9e5c1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/167502
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This also updates the vendored-in versions of several packages: 'go
mod vendor' selects a consistent version of each module, but we had
previously vendored an ad-hoc selection of packages.
Notably, x/crypto/hkdf was previously vendored in at a much newer
commit than the rest of x/crypto. Bringing the rest of x/crypto up to
that commit introduced an import of golang.org/x/sys/cpu, which broke
the js/wasm build, requiring an upgrade of x/sys to pick up CL 165749.
Updates #30228
Updates #30241
Updates #25822
Change-Id: I5b3dbc232b7e6a048a158cbd8d36137af1efb711
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/164623
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
It turns out not to be necessary. Russ expressed a preference for
avoiding module fetches over making 'go mod tidy' work within std and
cmd right away, so for now we will make the loader use the vendor
directory for the standard library even if '-mod=vendor' is not set
explicitly.
Updates #30228
Change-Id: Idf7208e63da8cb7bfe281b93ec21b61d40334947
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/166357
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Jay Conrod <jayconrod@google.com>
Args were duplicated by a mistake. Found using static analysis tools.
Change-Id: I2f61e09844bc409b1f687d654767332d93dd39a2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/164937
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
This CL changes the internal/cpu API to more closely match the
public version in x/sys/cpu (added in CL 163003). This will make it
easier to update the dependencies of vendored code. The most prominent
renaming is from VE1 to VXE for the vector-enhancements facility 1.
VXE is the mnemonic used for this facility in the HWCAP vector.
Change-Id: I922d6c8bb287900a4bd7af70567e22eac567b5c1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/164437
Reviewed-by: Martin Möhrmann <moehrmann@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
In Go 1.13 we will enable RSA-PSS in TLS 1.2 at the same time as we make
TLS 1.3 enabled by default.
This reverts commit 7ccd3583ed.
Updates #30055
Change-Id: I6f2ddf7652d1172a6b29f4e335ff3a71a89974bc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/163080
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Comparing err variable to be not nil is redundant in this case.
The code above ensures that it is always not nil.
Updates #30208
Change-Id: I0a41601273de36a05d22270a743c0bdedeb1d0bf
GitHub-Last-Rev: 372e0fd48f
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#30213
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/162439
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Nothing in Go can truly guarantee a key will be gone from memory (see
#21865), so remove that claim. That makes Reset useless, because
unlike most Reset methods it doesn't restore the original value state,
so deprecate it.
Change-Id: I6bb0f7f94c7e6dd4c5ac19761bc8e5df1f9ec618
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/162297
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Most of the issues that led to the decision on #30055 were related to
incompatibility with or faulty support for RSA-PSS (#29831, #29779,
v1.5 signatures). RSA-PSS is required by TLS 1.3, but is also available
to be negotiated in TLS 1.2.
Altering TLS 1.2 behavior based on GODEBUG=tls13=1 feels surprising, so
just disable RSA-PSS entirely in TLS 1.2 until TLS 1.3 is on by default,
so breakage happens all at once.
Updates #30055
Change-Id: Iee90454a20ded8895e5302e8bcbcd32e4e3031c2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/160998
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
If a certificate somehow has an AKID, it should still chain successfully
to a parent without a SKID, even if the latter is invalid according to
RFC 5280, because only the Subject is authoritative.
This reverts to the behavior before #29233 was fixed in 770130659. Roots
with the right subject will still be shadowed by roots with the right
SKID and the wrong subject, but that's been the case for a long time, and
is left for a more complete fix in Go 1.13.
Updates #30079
Change-Id: If8ab0179aca86cb74caa926d1ef93fb5e416b4bb
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/161097
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
If beta8 is unusually large, the addition loop might take a very long
time to bring x3-beta8 back positive.
This would lead to a DoS vulnerability in the implementation of the
P-521 and P-384 elliptic curves that may let an attacker craft inputs
to ScalarMult that consume excessive amounts of CPU.
This fixes CVE-2019-6486.
Fixes#29903
Change-Id: Ia969e8b5bf5ac4071a00722de9d5e4d856d8071a
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/399777
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/159218
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julie@golang.org>
ConstantTimeCompare is fairly useless if you can't rely on it being zero
when the slices are different, but thankfully it has that property
thanks to the final ConstantTimeByteEq.
Change-Id: Id51100ed7d8237abbbb15778a259065b162a48ad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/158643
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The no-cgo validation hack lets in certificates from the root store that
are not marked as roots themselves, but are signed by a root; the cgo
path correctly excludes them. When TestSystemRoots compares cgo and
no-cgo results it tries to ignore them by ignoring certificates which
pass validation, but expired certificates were failing validation.
Letting through expired certs is harmless anyway because we will refuse
to build chains to them.
Fixes#29497
Change-Id: I341e50c0f3426de2763468672f9ba1d13ad6cfba
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/156330
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
