Currently if type of public key is unsupported, error message is "only
RSA and ECDSA public keys supported". After adding Ed25519 this message
is no longer correct.
Moreover, it is superfluous because documentation for
MarshalPKIXPublicKey, CreateCertificateRequest and CreateCertificate
already lists supported public key types.
This CL removes unnecessary details from error message.
It also adds reporting the type of unsupported key, which helps
debugging cases when struct (instead of a pointer) to otherwise correct
public key is given.
Fixes#32640
Change-Id: I45e6e3d756b543688d850009b4da8a4023c05027
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/196777
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Use the following (suboptimal) script to obtain a list of possible
typos:
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -x
git ls-files |\
grep -e '\.\(c\|cc\|go\)$' |\
xargs -n 1\
awk\
'/\/\// { gsub(/.*\/\//, ""); print; } /\/\*/, /\*\// { gsub(/.*\/\*/, ""); gsub(/\*\/.*/, ""); }' |\
hunspell -d en_US -l |\
grep '^[[:upper:]]\{0,1\}[[:lower:]]\{1,\}$' |\
grep -v -e '^.\{1,4\}$' -e '^.\{16,\}$' |\
sort -f |\
uniq -c |\
awk '$1 == 1 { print $2; }'
Then, go through the results manually and fix the most obvious typos in
the non-vendored code.
Change-Id: I3cb5830a176850e1a0584b8a40b47bde7b260eae
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/193848
Reviewed-by: Robert Griesemer <gri@golang.org>
The exception allowed a specific intermediate [1] to chain up to a
broken root that lacked the CA:TRUE X509v3 Basic Constraint.
The broken root [2] is expiring at the end of 2019, so we can remove the
exception in Go 1.14.
Moreover, there is a reissued version of that root [3] (same Subject and
SPKI, valid CA) which expires in 2029, so root stores should have
migrated to it already, making the exception unnecessary.
[1]: https://crt.sh/?caid=57
[2]: https://crt.sh/?id=1616049
[3]: https://crt.sh/?id=55
Change-Id: I43f51100982791b0e8bac90d143b60851cd46dfc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/193038
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The current implementation panics on nil certificates,
so introduce a nil check and early return true if both
are nil, false if only one is.
Fixes#28743
Change-Id: I71b0dee3e505d3ad562a4470ccc22c3a2579bc52
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/167118
Run-TryBot: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
Include references in the package-level comment block, expand
the obscure IRO acronym, and add a reference for "the standard
(cryptographic) assumptions".
Fixes#33589
Change-Id: I76c3b0a2f7258b3ab4bf1c8e7681c5d159720a20
GitHub-Last-Rev: 30d5a1e2fb
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#33723
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/190840
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
SSLv3 has been irreparably broken since the POODLE attack 5 years ago
and RFC 7568 (f.k.a. draft-ietf-tls-sslv3-diediedie) prohibits its use
in no uncertain terms.
As announced in the Go 1.13 release notes, remove support for it
entirely in Go 1.14.
Updates #32716
Change-Id: Id653557961d8f75f484a01e6afd2e104a4ccceaf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/191976
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Session resumption is not a reliable TLS behavior: the server can decide
to reject a session ticket for a number of reasons, or no reason at all.
This makes this non-hermetic test extremely brittle.
It's currently broken on the builders for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, and
I could reproduce the issue for TLS 1.3 only. As I was debugging it, it
started passing entirely on my machine.
In practice, it doesn't get us any coverage as resumption is already
tested with the recorded exchange tests, and TestVerifyHostname still
provides a smoke test checking that we can in fact talk TLS.
Fixes#32978
Change-Id: I63505e22ff7704f25ad700d46e4ff14850ba5d3c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/186239
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
The localPipe implementation assumes that every successful net.Dial
results in exactly one successful listener.Accept. I don't believe this
is guaranteed by essentially any operating system. For this test, we're
seeing flakes on dragonfly (#29583).
But see also #19519, flakes due to the same assumption on FreeBSD
and macOS in package net's own tests.
This CL rewrites localPipe to try a few times to get a matching pair
of connections on the dial and accept side.
Fixes#29583.
Change-Id: Idb045b18c404eae457f091df20456c5ae879a291
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/184157
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
The RFC recommends checking the X25519 output to ensure it's not the
zero value, to guard against peers trying to remove contributory
behavior.
In TLS there should be enough transcript involvement to mitigate any
attack, and the RSA key exchange would suffer from the same issues by
design, so not proposing a backport.
See #31846
Change-Id: I8e657f8ee8aa72c3f8ca3b124555202638c53f5e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/183039
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Removed cross-dependencies between handshake_server_test.go and
handshake_client_test.go; moved all initialization to TestMain; replaced
SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable with -keylog flag.
Change-Id: Ida6712daa44e01a2c00658e8a1896087ee88bcb0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/183057
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Signing with RSA-PSS can uncover faulty crypto.Signer implementations,
and it can fail for (broken) small keys. We'll have to take that
breakage eventually, but it would be nice for it to be opt-out at first.
TLS 1.3 requires RSA-PSS and is opt-out in Go 1.13. Instead of making a
TLS 1.3 opt-out influence a TLS 1.2 behavior, let's wait to add RSA-PSS
to TLS 1.2 until TLS 1.3 is on without opt-out.
Note that since the Client Hello is sent before a protocol version is
selected, we have to advertise RSA-PSS there to support TLS 1.3.
That means that we still support RSA-PSS on the client in TLS 1.2 for
verifying server certificates, which is fine, as all issues arise on the
signing side. We have to be careful not to pick (or consider available)
RSA-PSS on the client for client certificates, though.
We'd expect tests to change only in TLS 1.2:
* the server won't pick PSS to sign the key exchange
(Server-TLSv12-* w/ RSA, TestHandshakeServerRSAPSS);
* the server won't advertise PSS in CertificateRequest
(Server-TLSv12-ClientAuthRequested*, TestClientAuth);
* and the client won't pick PSS for its CertificateVerify
(Client-TLSv12-ClientCert-RSA-*, TestHandshakeClientCertRSAPSS,
Client-TLSv12-Renegotiate* because "R" requests a client cert).
Client-TLSv13-ClientCert-RSA-RSAPSS was updated because of a fix in the test.
This effectively reverts 8834353072.
Testing was made more complex by the undocumented semantics of OpenSSL's
-[client_]sigalgs (see openssl/openssl#9172).
Updates #32425
Change-Id: Iaddeb2df1f5c75cd090cc8321df2ac8e8e7db349
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/182339
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The typed arrays returned by TypedArrayOf were backed by WebAssembly
memory. They became invalid each time we grow the WebAssembly memory.
This made them very error prone and hard to use correctly.
This change removes TypedArrayOf completely and instead introduces
CopyBytesToGo and CopyBytesToJS for copying bytes between a byte
slice and an Uint8Array. This breaking change is still allowed for
the syscall/js package.
Fixes#31980.
Fixes#31812.
Change-Id: I14c76fdd60b48dd517c1593972a56d04965cb272
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177537
Run-TryBot: Richard Musiol <neelance@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Cherry Zhang <cherryyz@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Utilize KDSA when available. This guarantees constant time operation on all three curves mentioned,
and is faster than conventional assembly. The IBM Z model(s) that support KDSA as used in this CL
are not yet publicly available, and so we are unable to release performance data at this time.
Change-Id: I85360dcf90fe42d2bf32afe3f638e282de10a518
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/174437
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
To a fifth reading of the relevant docs, it looks like
1) a constraint dictionary with no policy applies to all of them;
2) multiple applying constraint dictionaries should have their results OR'd;
3) untrusted certificates in the keychain should be used for chain building.
This fixes 1), approximates 2) and punts on 3).
Fixes#30672Fixes#30471
Change-Id: Ibbaabf0b77d267377c0b5de07abca3445c2c2302
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/178539
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Note how untrustedData is never NULL, so loadSystemRoots was checking
the wrong thing.
Also, renamed the C function to CopyPEMRoots to follow the
CoreFoundation naming convention on ownership.
Finally, redirect all debug output to standard error.
Change-Id: Ie80abefadf8974a75c0646aa02fcfcebcbe3bde8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/178538
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Shorten some of the longest tests that run during all.bash.
Removes 7r 50u 21s from all.bash.
After this change, all.bash is under 5 minutes again on my laptop.
For #26473.
Change-Id: Ie0460aa935808d65460408feaed210fbaa1d5d79
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177559
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Gerrit is complaining about pushes that affect these files
and forcing people to use -o nokeycheck, which defeats
the point of the check. Hide the keys from this kind of scan
by marking them explicitly as testing keys.
This is a little annoying but better than training everyone
who ever edits one of these test files to reflexively override
the Gerrit check.
The only remaining keys explicitly marked as private instead
of testing are in examples, and there's not much to do
about those. Hopefully they are not edited as much.
Change-Id: I4431592b5266cb39fe6a80b40e742d97da803a0b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/178178
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
In TLS 1.3 session tickets are delivered after the handshake, and it
looks like now the Google servers wait until the first flight of data to
send them (or our timeout is too low). Cause some data to be sent so we
can avoid the guessing game.
Fixes#32090
Change-Id: I54af4acb3a89cc70c9e14a5dfe18a44c29a841a7
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177877
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Support for Ed25519 certificates was added in CL 175478, this wires them
up into the TLS stack according to RFC 8422 (TLS 1.2) and RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3).
RFC 8422 also specifies support for TLS 1.0 and 1.1, and I initially
implemented that, but even OpenSSL doesn't take the complexity, so I
just dropped it. It would have required keeping a buffer of the
handshake transcript in order to do the direct Ed25519 signatures. We
effectively need to support TLS 1.2 because it shares ClientHello
signature algorithms with TLS 1.3.
While at it, reordered the advertised signature algorithms in the rough
order we would want to use them, also based on what curves have fast
constant-time implementations.
Client and client auth tests changed because of the change in advertised
signature algorithms in ClientHello and CertificateRequest.
Fixes#25355
Change-Id: I9fdd839afde4fd6b13fcbc5cc7017fd8c35085ee
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/177698
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Working toward making the tree vet-safe instead of having
so many exceptions in cmd/vet/all/whitelist.
This CL makes "go vet -unsafeptr=false runtime" happy for windows/*,
while keeping "GO_BUILDER_NAME=misc-vetall go tool dist test" happy too.
For #31916.
Change-Id: If37ab2b3f6fca4696b8a6afb2ef11ba6c4fb42e0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/176106
Reviewed-by: Austin Clements <austin@google.com>
The crypto/tls and crypto/x509 APIs leak PublicKey and PrivateKey types,
so in order to add support for Ed25519 certificates we need the ed25519
package in the stdlib.
It's also a primitive that's reasonable to use directly in applications,
as it is a modern, safe and fast signing algorithm, for which there
aren't higher level APIs. (The nacl/sign API is limiting in that it
repeats the message.)
A few docs changes will come in a follow-up, and a CL will land on
golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519 to make it a type alias wrapper on Go 1.13+.
Updates #25355
Change-Id: I057f20cc7d1aca2b95c29ce73eb03c3b237e413f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/174945
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Most changes are removing redundant declaration of type when direct
instantiating value of map or slice, e.g. []T{T{}} become []T{{}}.
Small changes are removing the high order of subslice if its value
is the length of slice itself, e.g. T[:len(T)] become T[:].
The following file is excluded due to incompatibility with go1.4,
- src/cmd/compile/internal/gc/ssa.go
Change-Id: Id3abb09401795ce1e6da591a89749cba8502fb26
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/166437
Run-TryBot: Dave Cheney <dave@cheney.net>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
I recently modified tabwriter to reduce the number of defers due to
flush calls. However, I forgot to notice that the new function
flushNoDefers can no longer return an error, due to the lack of the
defer.
In crypto/tls, hashForServerKeyExchange never returned a non-nil error,
so simplify the code.
Finally, in go/types and net we can find a few trivially unused
parameters, so remove them.
Change-Id: I54c8de83fbc944df432453b55c93008d7e810e61
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/174131
Run-TryBot: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Benny Siegert <bsiegert@gmail.com>
The CBC mode ciphers in TLS are a disaster. By ordering authentication
and encryption wrong, they are very subtly dependent on details and
implementation of the padding check, admitting attacks such as POODLE
and Lucky13.
crypto/tls does not promise full countermeasures for Lucky13 and still
contains some timing variations. This change fixes one of the easy ones:
by checking the MAC, then the padding, rather than all at once, there is
a very small timing variation between bad MAC and (good MAC, bad
padding).
The consequences depend on the effective padding value used in the MAC
when the padding is bad. extractPadding simply uses the last byte's
value, leaving the padding bytes effectively unchecked. This is the
scenario in SSL 3.0 that led to POODLE. Specifically, the attacker can
take an input record which uses 16 bytes of padding (a full block) and
replace the final block with some interesting block. The MAC check will
succeed with 1/256 probability due to the final byte being 16. This
again means that after 256 queries, the attacker can decrypt one byte.
To fix this, bitwise AND the two values so they may be checked with one
branch. Additionally, zero the padding if the padding check failed, to
make things more robust.
Updates #27071
Change-Id: I332b14d215078928ffafe3cfeba1a68189f08db3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/170701
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
The certificates argument to verifyServerCertificate must contain
at least one certificate. Simplify the intermediate certificate
handling code accordingly.
Change-Id: I8292cdfb51f418e011d6d97f47d10b4e631aa932
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/169657
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
The first biggest offender was crypto/des.init at ~1%. It's
cryptographically broken and the init function is relatively expensive,
which is unfortunate as both crypto/tls and crypto/x509 (and by
extension, cmd/go) import it. Hide the work behind sync.Once.
The second biggest offender was flag.sortFlags at just under 1%, used by
the Visit flagset methods. It allocated two slices, which made a
difference as cmd/go iterates over multiple flagsets during init.
Use a single slice with a direct sort.Interface implementation.
Another big offender is initializing global maps. Reducing this work in
cmd/go/internal/imports and net/textproto gives us close to another
whole 1% in saved work. The former can use map literals, and the latter
can hide the work behind sync.Once.
Finally, compress/flate used newHuffmanBitWriter as part of init, which
allocates many objects and slices. Yet it only used one of the slice
fields. Allocating just that slice saves a surprising ~0.3%, since we
generated a lot of unnecessary garbage.
All in all, these little pieces amount to just over 3% saved CPU time.
name old time/op new time/op delta
ExecGoEnv-8 3.61ms ± 1% 3.50ms ± 0% -3.02% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Updates #26775.
Updates #29382.
Change-Id: I915416e88a874c63235ba512617c8aef35c0ca8b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/166459
Run-TryBot: Daniel Martí <mvdan@mvdan.cc>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Alpine Linux uses /etc/ssl/cert.pem as default ca-bundle which
is preinstalled since 3.7 and was installed as part of the libressl
package in 3.5 and 3.6.
The path /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt is only valid if the full
ca-certificates package is installed by hand, which contains all
single CA certs and uses update-ca-certificates to bundle them.
The priority for /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt should be kept
higher than /etc/ssl/cert.pem in case the user installed custom
CA certs.
Change-Id: I1c86a6ad84d8ee1163560655743a5ce9f2408af1
GitHub-Last-Rev: 0ba4d599e4
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#31042
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/169238
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Standard output is reserved for actual program output.
Debug print should be limited in general (here they are
enabled by an environment variable) and always go to
standard error.
Came across by accident.
Change-Id: I1490be71473520f049719572b3acaa0ea9f9e5c1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/167502
Run-TryBot: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This also updates the vendored-in versions of several packages: 'go
mod vendor' selects a consistent version of each module, but we had
previously vendored an ad-hoc selection of packages.
Notably, x/crypto/hkdf was previously vendored in at a much newer
commit than the rest of x/crypto. Bringing the rest of x/crypto up to
that commit introduced an import of golang.org/x/sys/cpu, which broke
the js/wasm build, requiring an upgrade of x/sys to pick up CL 165749.
Updates #30228
Updates #30241
Updates #25822
Change-Id: I5b3dbc232b7e6a048a158cbd8d36137af1efb711
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/164623
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
It turns out not to be necessary. Russ expressed a preference for
avoiding module fetches over making 'go mod tidy' work within std and
cmd right away, so for now we will make the loader use the vendor
directory for the standard library even if '-mod=vendor' is not set
explicitly.
Updates #30228
Change-Id: Idf7208e63da8cb7bfe281b93ec21b61d40334947
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/166357
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Jay Conrod <jayconrod@google.com>
Args were duplicated by a mistake. Found using static analysis tools.
Change-Id: I2f61e09844bc409b1f687d654767332d93dd39a2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/164937
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
This CL changes the internal/cpu API to more closely match the
public version in x/sys/cpu (added in CL 163003). This will make it
easier to update the dependencies of vendored code. The most prominent
renaming is from VE1 to VXE for the vector-enhancements facility 1.
VXE is the mnemonic used for this facility in the HWCAP vector.
Change-Id: I922d6c8bb287900a4bd7af70567e22eac567b5c1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/164437
Reviewed-by: Martin Möhrmann <moehrmann@google.com>
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
In Go 1.13 we will enable RSA-PSS in TLS 1.2 at the same time as we make
TLS 1.3 enabled by default.
This reverts commit 7ccd3583ed.
Updates #30055
Change-Id: I6f2ddf7652d1172a6b29f4e335ff3a71a89974bc
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/163080
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Comparing err variable to be not nil is redundant in this case.
The code above ensures that it is always not nil.
Updates #30208
Change-Id: I0a41601273de36a05d22270a743c0bdedeb1d0bf
GitHub-Last-Rev: 372e0fd48f
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#30213
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/162439
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Nothing in Go can truly guarantee a key will be gone from memory (see
#21865), so remove that claim. That makes Reset useless, because
unlike most Reset methods it doesn't restore the original value state,
so deprecate it.
Change-Id: I6bb0f7f94c7e6dd4c5ac19761bc8e5df1f9ec618
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/162297
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Most of the issues that led to the decision on #30055 were related to
incompatibility with or faulty support for RSA-PSS (#29831, #29779,
v1.5 signatures). RSA-PSS is required by TLS 1.3, but is also available
to be negotiated in TLS 1.2.
Altering TLS 1.2 behavior based on GODEBUG=tls13=1 feels surprising, so
just disable RSA-PSS entirely in TLS 1.2 until TLS 1.3 is on by default,
so breakage happens all at once.
Updates #30055
Change-Id: Iee90454a20ded8895e5302e8bcbcd32e4e3031c2
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/160998
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
If a certificate somehow has an AKID, it should still chain successfully
to a parent without a SKID, even if the latter is invalid according to
RFC 5280, because only the Subject is authoritative.
This reverts to the behavior before #29233 was fixed in 770130659. Roots
with the right subject will still be shadowed by roots with the right
SKID and the wrong subject, but that's been the case for a long time, and
is left for a more complete fix in Go 1.13.
Updates #30079
Change-Id: If8ab0179aca86cb74caa926d1ef93fb5e416b4bb
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/161097
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
If beta8 is unusually large, the addition loop might take a very long
time to bring x3-beta8 back positive.
This would lead to a DoS vulnerability in the implementation of the
P-521 and P-384 elliptic curves that may let an attacker craft inputs
to ScalarMult that consume excessive amounts of CPU.
This fixes CVE-2019-6486.
Fixes#29903
Change-Id: Ia969e8b5bf5ac4071a00722de9d5e4d856d8071a
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/399777
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julieqiu@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/159218
Reviewed-by: Julie Qiu <julie@golang.org>
ConstantTimeCompare is fairly useless if you can't rely on it being zero
when the slices are different, but thankfully it has that property
thanks to the final ConstantTimeByteEq.
Change-Id: Id51100ed7d8237abbbb15778a259065b162a48ad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/158643
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The no-cgo validation hack lets in certificates from the root store that
are not marked as roots themselves, but are signed by a root; the cgo
path correctly excludes them. When TestSystemRoots compares cgo and
no-cgo results it tries to ignore them by ignoring certificates which
pass validation, but expired certificates were failing validation.
Letting through expired certs is harmless anyway because we will refuse
to build chains to them.
Fixes#29497
Change-Id: I341e50c0f3426de2763468672f9ba1d13ad6cfba
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/156330
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
On macOS 10.11, but not 10.10 and 10.12, the C API returns 5 old root
CAs which are not in SystemRootCertificates.keychain (but seem to be in
X509Anchors and maybe SystemCACertificates.keychain, along with many
others that the C API does not return). They all are moribund 1024-bit
roots which are now gone from the Apple store.
Since we can't seem to find a way to make the no-cgo code see them,
ignore them rather than skipping the test.
Fixes#21416
Change-Id: I24ff0461f71cec953b888a60b05b99bc37dad2ed
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/156329
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
That number grows quadratically with the number of intermediate
certificates in certain pathological cases (for example if they all have
the same Subject) leading to a CPU DoS. Set a fixed budget that should
fit all real world chains, given we only look at intermediates provided
by the peer.
The algorithm can be improved, but that's left for follow-up CLs:
* the cache logic should be reviewed for correctness, as it seems to
override the entire chain with the cached one
* the equality check should compare Subject and public key, not the
whole certificate
* certificates with the right SKID but the wrong Subject should not
be considered, and in particular should not take priority over
certificates with the right Subject
Fixes#29233
Change-Id: Ib257c12cd5563df7723f9c81231d82b882854213
Reviewed-on: https://team-review.git.corp.google.com/c/370475
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bonventre <andybons@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/154105
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
After CL 128056 the build fails on darwin/386 with
src/crypto/x509/root_cgo_darwin.go:218:55: warning: values of type 'SInt32' should not be used as format arguments; add an explicit cast to 'int' instead [-Wformat]
go build crypto/x509: C compiler warning promoted to error on Go builders
Fix the warning by explicitly casting the argument to an int as
suggested by the warning.
Change-Id: Icb6bd622a543e9bc5f669fd3d7abd418b4a8e579
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/152958
Run-TryBot: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Now that the cgo and no-cgo paths should be correct and equivalent,
re-enable the TestSystemRoots test without any margin of error (which
was tripping anyway when users had too many of a certain edge-case).
As a last quirk, the verify-cert invocation will validate certificates
that aren't roots, but are signed by valid roots. Ignore them.
Fixes#24652
Change-Id: I6a8ff3c2282136d7122a4e7e387eb8014da0d28a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/128117
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Certificates without any trust settings might still be in the keychain
(for example if they used to have some, or if they are intermediates for
offline verification), but they are not to be trusted. The only ones we
can trust unconditionally are the ones in the system roots store.
Moreover, the verify-cert invocation was not specifying the ssl policy,
defaulting instead to the basic one. We have no way of communicating
different usages in a CertPool, so stick to the WebPKI use-case as the
primary one for crypto/x509.
Updates #24652
Change-Id: Ife8b3d2f4026daa1223aa81fac44aeeb4f96528a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/128116
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The cgo path was not taking policies into account, using the last
security setting in the array whatever it was. Also, it was not aware of
the defaults for empty security settings, and for security settings
without a result type. Finally, certificates restricted to a hostname
were considered roots.
The API docs for this code are partial and not very clear, so this is a
best effort, really.
Updates #24652
Change-Id: I8fa2fe4706f44f3d963b32e0615d149e997b537d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/128056
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
In the s390x assembly implementation of NIST P-256 curve, utilize faster multiply/square
instructions introduced in the z14. These new instructions are designed for crypto
and are constant time. The algorithm is unchanged except for faster
multiplication when run on a z14 or later. On z13, the original mutiplication
(also constant time) is used.
P-256 performance is critical in many applications, such as Blockchain.
name old time new time delta
BaseMultP256 24396 ns/op 21564 ns/op 1.13x
ScalarMultP256 87546 ns/op 72813 ns/op. 1.20x
Change-Id: I7e6d8b420fac56d5f9cc13c9423e2080df854bac
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/146022
Reviewed-by: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
signatureSchemesForCertificate was written to be used with TLS 1.3, but
ended up used for TLS 1.2 client certificates in a refactor. Since it
only supported TLS 1.3 signature algorithms, it would lead to no RSA
client certificates being sent to servers that didn't support RSA-PSS.
TestHandshakeClientCertRSAPKCS1v15 was testing *specifically* for this,
but alas the OpenSSL flag -verify accepts an empty certificates list as
valid, as opposed to -Verify...
Fixes#28925
Change-Id: I61afc02ca501d3d64ab4ad77bbb4cf10931e6f93
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/151660
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Packages in vendor/ directories have a "vendor/" path prefix in GOPATH
mode, but intentionally do not in module mode. Since the import path
is embedded in the compiled output, changing that path invalidates
cache entries and causes cmd/go to try to rebuild (and reinstall) the
vendored libraries, which will fail if the directory containing those
libraries is read-only.
If I understood correctly, this is the approach Russ suggested as an
alternative to https://golang.org/cl/136138.
Fixes#27285Fixes#26988
Change-Id: I8a2507fa892b84cde0a803aaa79e460723da572b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147443
Run-TryBot: Bryan C. Mills <bcmills@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Russ Cox <rsc@golang.org>
Since they are sent after the handshake in TLS 1.3, the client was not
actually consuming them, as it doesn't make any Read calls. They were
then sitting in the kernel receive buffer when the client would call
Close. The kernel would see that and send a RST, which would race the
closeNotify, causing errors.
Also, we get to trim 600 lines of useless test data.
Fixes#28852
Change-Id: I7517feab77dabab7504bfc111098ba09ea07ae5e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/151659
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
UserHomeDir used to return an empty string if the corresponding
environment variable was not set. Changed it to return an error if the
variable is not set, to have the same signature and behaviour as UserCacheDir.
Fixes#28562
Change-Id: I42c497e8011ecfbbadebe7de1751575273be221c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/150418
Run-TryBot: Tobias Klauser <tobias.klauser@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Procedure names should reflect what they do; function names
should reflect what they return. Functions are used in
expressions, often in things like if's, so they need
to read appropriately.
if CheckHMAC(a, b, key)
is unhelpful because we can't deduce whether CheckHMAC
returns true on error or non-error; instead
if ValidHMAC(a, b, key)
makes the point clear and makes a future mistake
in using the routine less likely.
https://www.lysator.liu.se/c/pikestyle.html
Change-Id: I7c4b1981c90c8d7475ddd8ec18dee3db2e0f42df
GitHub-Last-Rev: 32199a418b
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#28823
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/149857
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
The Config does not own the memory pointed to by the Certificate slice.
Instead, opportunistically use Certificate.Leaf and let the application
set it if it desires the performance gain.
This is a partial rollback of CL 107627. See the linked issue for the
full explanation.
Fixes#28744
Change-Id: I33ce9e6712e3f87939d9d0932a06d24e48ba4567
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/149098
Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
Run-TryBot: Emmanuel Odeke <emm.odeke@gmail.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Fix a couple overlooked ConnectionState fields noticed by net/http
tests, and add a test in crypto/tls. Spun off CL 147638 to keep that one
cleanly about enabling TLS 1.3.
Change-Id: I9a6c2e68d64518a44be2a5d7b0b7b8d78c98c95d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/148900
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bonventre <andybons@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV is extremely fragile in the presence of sparse
supported_version, but gave it the best try I could.
Set the server random canaries but don't check them yet, waiting for the
browsers to clear the way of misbehaving middleboxes.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: Ie55efdec671d639cf1e716acef0c5f103e91a7ce
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147617
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Note that the SignatureSchemes passed to GetClientCertificate in TLS 1.2
are now filtered by the requested certificate type. This feels like an
improvement anyway, and the full list can be surfaced as well when
support for signature_algorithms_cert is added, which actually matches
the semantics of the CertificateRequest signature_algorithms in TLS 1.2.
Also, note a subtle behavior change in server side resumption: if a
certificate is requested but not required, and the resumed session did
not include one, it used not to invoke VerifyPeerCertificate. However,
if the resumed session did include a certificate, it would. (If a
certificate was required but not in the session, the session is rejected
in checkForResumption.) This inconsistency could be unexpected, even
dangerous, so now VerifyPeerCertificate is always invoked. Still not
consistent with the client behavior, which does not ever invoke
VerifyPeerCertificate on resumption, but it felt too surprising to
entirely change either.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: Ib2b0dbc30e659208dca3ac07d6c687a407d7aaaf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147599
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Added some assertions to testHandshake, but avoided checking the error
of one of the Close() because the one that would lose the race would
write the closeNotify to a connection closed on the other side which is
broken on js/wasm (#28650). Moved that Close() after the chan sync to
ensure it happens second.
Accepting a ticket with client certificates when NoClientCert is
configured is probably not a problem, and we could hide them to avoid
confusing the application, but the current behavior is to skip the
ticket, and I'd rather keep behavior changes to a minimum.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I93b56e44ddfe3d48c2bef52c83285ba2f46f297a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147445
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Also check original certificate validity when resuming TLS 1.0–1.2. Will
refuse to resume a session if the certificate is expired or if the
original connection had InsecureSkipVerify and the resumed one doesn't.
Support only PSK+DHE to protect forward secrecy even with lack of a
strong session ticket rotation story.
Tested with NSS because s_server does not provide any way of getting the
same session ticket key across invocations. Will self-test like TLS
1.0–1.2 once server side is implemented.
Incorporates CL 128477 by @santoshankr.
Fixes#24919
Updates #9671
Change-Id: Id3eaa5b6c77544a1357668bf9ff255f3420ecc34
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147420
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Looks like the introduction of CCS records in the client second flight
gave time to s_server to send NewSessionTicket messages in between the
client application data and close_notify. There seems to be no way of
turning NewSessionTicket messages off, neither by not sending a
psk_key_exchange_modes extension, nor by command line flag.
Interleaving the client write like that tickled an issue akin to #18701:
on Windows, the client reaches Close() before the last record is drained
from the send buffer, the kernel notices and resets the connection,
cutting short the last flow. There is no good way of synchronizing this,
so we sleep for a RTT before calling close, like in CL 75210. Sigh.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I44dc1cca17b373695b5a18c2741f218af2990bd1
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147419
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Since TLS 1.3 delivers handshake messages (including KeyUpdate) after
the handshake, the want argument to readRecord had became almost
pointless: it only meant something when set to recordTypeChangeCipherSpec.
Replaced it with a bool to reflect that, and added two shorthands to
avoid anonymous bools in calls.
Took the occasion to simplify and formalize the invariants of readRecord.
The maxConsecutiveEmptyRecords loop became useless when readRecord
started retrying on any non-advancing record in CL 145297.
Replaced panics with errors, because failure is better than undefined
behavior, but contained failure is better than a DoS vulnerability. For
example, I suspect the panic at the top of readRecord was reachable from
handleRenegotiation, which calls readHandshake with handshakeComplete
false. Thankfully it was not a panic in 1.11, and it's allowed now.
Removed Client-TLSv13-RenegotiationRejected because OpenSSL isn't
actually willing to ask for renegotiation over TLS 1.3, the expected
error was due to NewSessionTicket messages, which didn't break the rest
of the tests because they stop too soon.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I297a81bde5c8020a962a92891b70d6d70b90f5e3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147418
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Also, add support for the SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable to the
tests, to simplify debugging of unexpected failures.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I20a34a5824f083da93097b793d51e796d6eb302b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147417
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Now, this is embarrassing. While preparing CL 142818, I noticed a
possible vulnerability in the existing code which I was rewriting. I
took a note to go back and assess if it was indeed an issue, and in case
start the security release process. The note unintentionally slipped
into the commit. Fortunately, there was no vulnerability.
What caught my eye was that I had fixed the calculation of the minimum
encrypted payload length from
roundUp(explicitIVLen+macSize+1, blockSize)
to (using the same variable names)
explicitIVLen + roundUp(macSize+1, blockSize)
The explicit nonce sits outside of the encrypted payload, so it should
not be part of the value rounded up to the CBC block size.
You can see that for some values of the above, the old result could be
lower than the correct value. An unexpectedly short payload might cause
a panic during decryption (a DoS vulnerability) or even more serious
issues due to the constant time code that follows it (see for example
Yet Another Padding Oracle in OpenSSL CBC Ciphersuites [1]).
In practice, explicitIVLen is either zero or equal to blockSize, so it
does not change the amount of rounding up necessary and the two
formulations happen to be identical. Nothing to see here.
It looked more suspicious than it is in part due to the fact that the
explicitIVLen definition moved farther into hc.explicitNonceLen() and
changed name from IV (which suggests a block length) to nonce (which
doesn't necessarily). But anyway it was never meant to surface or be
noted, except it slipped, so here we are for a boring explanation.
[1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/yet-another-padding-oracle-in-openssl-cbc-ciphersuites/
Change-Id: I365560dfe006513200fa877551ce7afec9115fdf
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147637
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Go documentation style for boolean funcs is to say:
// Foo reports whether ...
func Foo() bool
(rather than "returns true if")
This CL also replaces 4 uses of "iff" with the same "reports whether"
wording, which doesn't lose any meaning, and will prevent people from
sending typo fixes when they don't realize it's "if and only if". In
the past I think we've had the typo CLs updated to just say "reports
whether". So do them all at once.
(Inspired by the addition of another "returns true if" in CL 146938
in fd_plan9.go)
Created with:
$ perl -i -npe 's/returns true if/reports whether/' $(git grep -l "returns true iff" | grep -v vendor)
$ perl -i -npe 's/returns true if/reports whether/' $(git grep -l "returns true if" | grep -v vendor)
Change-Id: Ided502237f5ab0d25cb625dbab12529c361a8b9f
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147037
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
Implement a basic TLS 1.3 server handshake, only enabled if explicitly
requested with MaxVersion.
This CL intentionally leaves for future CLs:
- PSK modes and resumption
- client authentication
- compatibility mode ChangeCipherSpecs
- early data skipping
- post-handshake messages
- downgrade protection
- KeyLogWriter support
- TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV processing
It also leaves a few areas up for a wider refactor (maybe in Go 1.13):
- the certificate selection logic can be significantly improved,
including supporting and surfacing signature_algorithms_cert, but
this isn't new in TLS 1.3 (see comment in processClientHello)
- handshake_server_tls13.go can be dried up and broken into more
meaningful, smaller functions, but it felt premature to do before
PSK and client auth support
- the monstrous ClientHello equality check in doHelloRetryRequest can
get both cleaner and more complete with collaboration from the
parsing layer, which can come at the same time as extension
duplicates detection
Updates #9671
Change-Id: Id9db2b6ecc2eea21bf9b59b6d1d9c84a7435151c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/147017
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
crypto/x509 already supports PSS signatures (with rsaEncryption OID),
and crypto/tls support was added in CL 79736. Advertise support for the
algorithms and accept them as a peer.
Note that this is about PSS signatures from regular RSA public keys.
RSA-PSS only public keys (with RSASSA-PSS OID) are supported in neither
crypto/tls nor crypto/x509. See RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3.
testdata/Server-TLSv12-ClientAuthRequested* got modified because the
CertificateRequest carries the supported signature algorithms.
The net/smtp tests changed because 512 bits keys are too small for PSS.
Based on Peter Wu's CL 79738, who did all the actual work in CL 79736.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I4a31e9c6e152ff4c50a5c8a274edd610d5fff231
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/146258
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
RFC 8446 recommends using the supported_versions extension to negotiate
lower versions as well, so begin by implementing it to negotiate the
currently supported versions.
Note that pickTLSVersion was incorrectly negotiating the ServerHello
version down on the client. If the server had illegally sent a version
higher than the ClientHello version, the client would have just
downgraded it, hopefully failing later in the handshake.
In TestGetConfigForClient, we were hitting the record version check
because the server would select TLS 1.1, the handshake would fail on the
client which required TLS 1.2, which would then send a TLS 1.0 record
header on its fatal alert (not having negotiated a version), while the
server would expect a TLS 1.1 header at that point. Now, the client gets
to communicate the minimum version through the extension and the
handshake fails on the server.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: Ie33c7124c0c769f62e10baad51cbed745c424e5b
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/146217
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
Note that there is significant code duplication due to extensions with
the same format appearing in different messages in TLS 1.3. This will be
cleaned up in a future refactor once CL 145317 is merged.
Enforcing the presence/absence of each extension in each message is left
to the upper layer, based on both protocol version and extensions
advertised in CH and CR. Duplicated extensions and unknown extensions in
SH, EE, HRR, and CT will be tightened up in a future CL.
The TLS 1.2 CertificateStatus message was restricted to accepting only
type OCSP as any other type (none of which are specified so far) would
have to be negotiated.
Updates #9671
Change-Id: I7c42394c5cc0af01faa84b9b9f25fdc6e7cfbb9e
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/145477
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
This change uses library functions such as bits.RotateLeft32 to
reduce the amount of code needed in the generic implementation.
Since the code is now shorter I've also removed the option to
generate a non-unrolled version of the code.
I've also tried to remove bounds checks where possible to make
the new version performant, however that is not the primary goal
of this change since most architectures have assembly
implementations already.
Assembly performance:
name old speed new speed delta
Hash8Bytes 50.3MB/s ± 1% 59.1MB/s ± 0% +17.63% (p=0.000 n=9+8)
Hash1K 590MB/s ± 0% 597MB/s ± 0% +1.25% (p=0.000 n=9+9)
Hash8K 636MB/s ± 1% 638MB/s ± 1% ~ (p=0.072 n=10+10)
Hash8BytesUnaligned 50.5MB/s ± 0% 59.1MB/s ± 1% +17.09% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Hash1KUnaligned 589MB/s ± 1% 596MB/s ± 1% +1.23% (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Hash8KUnaligned 638MB/s ± 1% 640MB/s ± 0% +0.35% (p=0.002 n=10+10)
Pure Go performance:
name old speed new speed delta
Hash8Bytes 30.3MB/s ± 1% 42.8MB/s ± 0% +41.20% (p=0.000 n=9+9)
Hash1K 364MB/s ± 4% 394MB/s ± 1% +8.27% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Hash8K 404MB/s ± 1% 420MB/s ± 0% +4.17% (p=0.000 n=10+9)
Hash8BytesUnaligned 30.3MB/s ± 1% 42.8MB/s ± 1% +40.92% (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Hash1KUnaligned 368MB/s ± 0% 394MB/s ± 0% +7.07% (p=0.000 n=9+9)
Hash8KUnaligned 404MB/s ± 1% 411MB/s ± 3% +1.91% (p=0.026 n=9+10)
Change-Id: I9a91fb52ea8d62964d5351bdf121e9fbc9282852
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/137355
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
I am working on a TLS server program, which issues new TLS certificates
on demand. The new certificates will be added into tls.Config.Certificates.
BuildNameToCertificate will be called to refresh the name table afterwards.
This change will reduce some workload on existing certificates.
Note that you can’t modify the Certificates field (or call BuildNameToCertificate)
on a Config in use by a Server. You can however modify an unused Config that gets
cloned in GetConfigForClient with appropriate locking.
Change-Id: I7bdb7d23fc5d68df83c73f3bfa3ba9181d38fbde
GitHub-Last-Rev: c3788f4116
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#24920
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/107627
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This change will aid users to make less mistakes where you, for example, define both HTTP/1.1 and H2, but in the wrong order.
package main
import (
"crypto/tls"
"net"
)
func main() {
srv := &http.Server{
TLSConfig: &tls.Config{
NextProtos: []string{"http/1.1", "h2"},
},
}
srv.ListenAndServeTLS("server.crt", "server.key")
}
When using major browsers or curl, they will never be served H2 since they also support HTTP/1.0 and the list is processed in order.
Change-Id: Id14098b5e48f624ca308137917874d475c2f22a0
GitHub-Last-Rev: f3594a6411
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#28367
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/144387
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
As a first round, rewrite those handshake message types which can be
reused in TLS 1.3 with golang.org/x/crypto/cryptobyte. All other types
changed significantly in TLS 1.3 and will require separate
implementations. They will be ported to cryptobyte in a later CL.
The only semantic changes should be enforcing the random length on the
marshaling side, enforcing a couple more "must not be empty" on the
unmarshaling side, and checking the rest of the SNI list even if we only
take the first.
Change-Id: Idd2ced60c558fafcf02ee489195b6f3b4735fe22
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/144115
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
The arm5 and mips builders are can't-send-a-packet-to-localhost-in-1s
slow apparently. 1m is less useful, but still better than an obscure
test timeout panic.
Fixes#28405
Change-Id: I2feeae6ea1b095114caccaab4f6709f405faebad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/145037
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The equal methods were only there for testing, and I remember regularly
getting them wrong while developing tls-tris. Replace them with simple
reflect.DeepEqual calls.
The only special thing that equal() would do is ignore the difference
between a nil and a zero-length slice. Fixed the Generate methods so
that they create the same value that unmarshal will decode. The
difference is not important: it wasn't tested, all checks are
"len(slice) > 0", and all cases in which presence matters are
accompanied by a boolean.
Change-Id: Iaabf56ea17c2406b5107c808c32f6c85b611aaa8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/144114
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
If something causes the recorded tests to deviate from the expected
flows, they might wait forever for data that is not coming. Add a short
timeout, after which a useful error message is shown.
Change-Id: Ib11ccc0e17dcb8b2180493556017275678abbb08
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/144116
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
This adds a crypto/tls.RecordHeaderError.Conn field containing the TLS
underlying net.Conn for non-TLS handshake errors, and then uses it in
the net/http Server to return plaintext HTTP 400 errors when a client
mistakenly sends a plaintext HTTP request to an HTTPS server. This is the
same behavior as Apache.
Also in crypto/tls: swap two error paths to not use a value before
it's valid, and don't send a alert record when a handshake contains a
bogus TLS record (a TLS record in response won't help a non-TLS
client).
Fixes#23689
Change-Id: Ife774b1e3886beb66f25ae4587c62123ccefe847
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/143177
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
The crypto/tls record layer used a custom buffer implementation with its
own semantics, freelist, and offset management. Replace it all with
per-task bytes.Buffer, bytes.Reader and byte slices, along with a
refactor of all the encrypt and decrypt code.
The main quirk of *block was to do a best-effort read past the record
boundary, so that if a closeNotify was waiting it would be peeked and
surfaced along with the last Read. Address that with atLeastReader and
ReadFrom to avoid a useless copy (instead of a LimitReader or CopyN).
There was also an optimization to split blocks along record boundary
lines without having to copy in and out the data. Replicate that by
aliasing c.input into consumed c.rawInput (after an in-place decrypt
operation). This is safe because c.rawInput is not used until c.input is
drained.
The benchmarks are noisy but look like an improvement across the board,
which is a nice side effect :)
name old time/op new time/op delta
HandshakeServer/RSA-8 817µs ± 2% 797µs ± 2% -2.52% (p=0.000 n=10+9)
HandshakeServer/ECDHE-P256-RSA-8 984µs ±11% 897µs ± 0% -8.89% (p=0.000 n=10+9)
HandshakeServer/ECDHE-P256-ECDSA-P256-8 206µs ±10% 199µs ± 3% ~ (p=0.113 n=10+9)
HandshakeServer/ECDHE-X25519-ECDSA-P256-8 204µs ± 3% 202µs ± 1% -1.06% (p=0.013 n=10+9)
HandshakeServer/ECDHE-P521-ECDSA-P521-8 15.5ms ± 0% 15.6ms ± 1% ~ (p=0.095 n=9+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/1MB-8 5.35ms ±19% 5.39ms ±36% ~ (p=1.000 n=9+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/2MB-8 9.20ms ±15% 8.30ms ± 8% -9.79% (p=0.035 n=10+9)
Throughput/MaxPacket/4MB-8 13.8ms ± 7% 13.6ms ± 8% ~ (p=0.315 n=10+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/8MB-8 25.1ms ± 3% 23.2ms ± 2% -7.66% (p=0.000 n=10+9)
Throughput/MaxPacket/16MB-8 46.9ms ± 1% 43.0ms ± 3% -8.29% (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/32MB-8 88.9ms ± 2% 82.3ms ± 2% -7.40% (p=0.000 n=9+9)
Throughput/MaxPacket/64MB-8 175ms ± 2% 164ms ± 4% -6.18% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/1MB-8 5.79ms ±26% 5.82ms ±22% ~ (p=0.912 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/2MB-8 9.23ms ±14% 9.50ms ±23% ~ (p=0.971 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/4MB-8 14.5ms ±11% 13.8ms ± 6% -4.66% (p=0.019 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/8MB-8 25.6ms ± 4% 23.5ms ± 3% -8.33% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/16MB-8 47.3ms ± 3% 44.6ms ± 7% -5.65% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/32MB-8 91.9ms ±14% 85.0ms ± 4% -7.55% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/64MB-8 177ms ± 2% 168ms ± 4% -4.97% (p=0.000 n=8+10)
Latency/MaxPacket/200kbps-8 694ms ± 0% 694ms ± 0% ~ (p=0.315 n=10+9)
Latency/MaxPacket/500kbps-8 279ms ± 0% 279ms ± 0% ~ (p=0.447 n=9+10)
Latency/MaxPacket/1000kbps-8 140ms ± 0% 140ms ± 0% ~ (p=0.661 n=9+10)
Latency/MaxPacket/2000kbps-8 71.1ms ± 0% 71.1ms ± 0% +0.05% (p=0.019 n=9+9)
Latency/MaxPacket/5000kbps-8 30.4ms ± 7% 30.5ms ± 4% ~ (p=0.720 n=9+10)
Latency/DynamicPacket/200kbps-8 134ms ± 0% 134ms ± 0% ~ (p=0.075 n=10+10)
Latency/DynamicPacket/500kbps-8 54.8ms ± 0% 54.8ms ± 0% ~ (p=0.631 n=10+10)
Latency/DynamicPacket/1000kbps-8 28.5ms ± 0% 28.5ms ± 0% ~ (p=1.000 n=8+8)
Latency/DynamicPacket/2000kbps-8 15.7ms ±12% 16.1ms ± 0% ~ (p=0.109 n=10+7)
Latency/DynamicPacket/5000kbps-8 8.20ms ±26% 8.17ms ±13% ~ (p=1.000 n=9+9)
name old speed new speed delta
Throughput/MaxPacket/1MB-8 193MB/s ±14% 202MB/s ±30% ~ (p=0.897 n=8+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/2MB-8 230MB/s ±14% 249MB/s ±17% ~ (p=0.089 n=10+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/4MB-8 304MB/s ± 6% 309MB/s ± 7% ~ (p=0.315 n=10+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/8MB-8 334MB/s ± 3% 362MB/s ± 2% +8.29% (p=0.000 n=10+9)
Throughput/MaxPacket/16MB-8 358MB/s ± 1% 390MB/s ± 3% +9.08% (p=0.000 n=9+10)
Throughput/MaxPacket/32MB-8 378MB/s ± 2% 408MB/s ± 2% +8.00% (p=0.000 n=9+9)
Throughput/MaxPacket/64MB-8 384MB/s ± 2% 410MB/s ± 4% +6.61% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/1MB-8 178MB/s ±24% 182MB/s ±24% ~ (p=0.604 n=9+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/2MB-8 228MB/s ±13% 225MB/s ±20% ~ (p=0.971 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/4MB-8 291MB/s ±10% 305MB/s ± 6% +4.83% (p=0.019 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/8MB-8 327MB/s ± 4% 357MB/s ± 3% +9.08% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/16MB-8 355MB/s ± 3% 376MB/s ± 6% +6.07% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/32MB-8 366MB/s ±12% 395MB/s ± 4% +7.91% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
Throughput/DynamicPacket/64MB-8 380MB/s ± 2% 400MB/s ± 4% +5.26% (p=0.000 n=8+10)
Note that this reduced the buffer for the first read from 1024 to 5+512,
so it triggered the issue described at #24198 when using a synchronous
net.Pipe: the first server flight was not being consumed entirely by the
first read anymore, causing a deadlock as both the client and the server
were trying to send (the client a reply to the ServerHello, the server
the rest of the buffer). Fixed by rebasing on top of CL 142817.
Change-Id: Ie31b0a572b2ad37878469877798d5c6a5276f931
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/142818
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
crypto/tls is meant to work over network connections with buffering, not
synchronous connections, as explained in #24198. Tests based on net.Pipe
are unrealistic as reads and writes are matched one to one. Such tests
worked just thanks to the implementation details of the tls.Conn
internal buffering, and would break if for example the flush of the
first flight of the server was not entirely assimilated by the client
rawInput buffer before the client attempted to reply to the ServerHello.
Note that this might run into the Darwin network issues at #25696.
Fixed a few test races that were either hidden or synchronized by the
use of the in-memory net.Pipe.
Also, this gets us slightly more realistic benchmarks, reflecting some
syscall cost of Read and Write operations.
Change-Id: I5a597b3d7a81b8ccc776030cc837133412bf50f8
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/142817
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Use the format "RFC XXXX, Section X.X" (or "Appendix Y.X") as it fits
more properly in prose than a link, is more future-proof, and as there
are multiple ways to render an RFC. Capital "S" to follow the quoting
standard of RFCs themselves.
Applied the new goimports grouping to all files in those packages, too.
Change-Id: I01267bb3a3b02664f8f822e97b129075bb14d404
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/141918
Reviewed-by: Dmitri Shuralyov <dmitshur@golang.org>
This commit adds AIX operating system to crypto package for ppc64
architecture.
Updates: #25893
Change-Id: I20047ff2fef0051b8b235ec15b064c4a95c2b9c3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/138722
Run-TryBot: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962#section-3.3, the SCT
must be at least one byte long. The parsing code correctly checks for
this condition, but rarely the test does generate an empty SCT.
Change-Id: If36a34985b4470a5a9f96affc159195c04f6bfad
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/129755
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
As pointed out in https://github.com/golang/go/issues/26463,
HOME (or equivalent) environment variable (rather than the
value obtained by parsing /etc/passwd or the like) should be
used to obtain user's home directory.
Since commit fa1a49aa55 there's a method to obtain
user's home directory -- use it here.
Change-Id: I852fbb24249bcfe08f3874fae6e7b9d01d869190
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/139426
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Don't worry, this patch just remove trailing whitespace from
assembly files, and does not touch any logical changes.
Change-Id: Ia724ac0b1abf8bc1e41454bdc79289ef317c165d
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/113595
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
A simple grep over the codebase for "the the" which is often
missed by humans.
Change-Id: Ie4b4f07abfc24c73dcd51c8ef1edf4f73514a21c
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/138335
Reviewed-by: Dave Cheney <dave@cheney.net>
I omitted vendor directories and anything necessary for bootstrapping.
(Tested by bootstrapping with Go 1.4)
Updates #27864
Change-Id: I7d9b68d0372d3a34dee22966cca323513ece7e8a
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/137856
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Lance Taylor <iant@golang.org>
At least one popular service puts a hostname which contains a ":"
in the Common Name field. On the other hand, I don't know of any name
constrained certificates that only work if we ignore such CNs.
Updates #24151
Change-Id: I2d813e3e522ebd65ab5ea5cd83390467a869eea3
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/134076
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
The words 'the returned' were changed to 'a returned' in
8201b92aae when referring to the value
returned by SystemCertPool. Brad Fitz pointed out after that commit was
merged that it makes the wording of this function doc inconsistent with
rest of the stdlib since 'a returned' is not used anywhere, but 'the
returned' is frequently used.
Fixes#27385
Change-Id: I289b533a5a0b5c63eaf0abb6dec0085388ecf76b
GitHub-Last-Rev: 6c83b80257
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#27438
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/132776
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The sentence in the docs for SystemCertPool that states that mutations
to a returned pool do not affect any other pool is ambiguous as to who
the any other pools are, because pools can be created in multiple ways
that have nothing to do with the system certificate pool. Also the use
of the word 'the' instead of 'a' early in the sentence implies there is
only one shared pool ever returned.
Fixes#27385
Change-Id: I43adbfca26fdd66c4adbf06eb85361139a1dea93
GitHub-Last-Rev: 2f1ba09fa4
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#27388
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/132378
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
The unexported field is hidden from reflect based marshalers, which
would break otherwise. Also, make it return an error, as there are
multiple reasons it might fail.
Fixes#27125
Change-Id: I92adade2fe456103d2d5c0315629ca0256953764
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/130535
Run-TryBot: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Since the 12.x branch, the getrandom syscall had been introduced
with similar interface as Linux's and consistent syscall id
across architectures.
Change-Id: I63d6b45dbe9e29f07f1b5b6c2ec8be4fa624b9ee
GitHub-Last-Rev: 6fb76e6522
GitHub-Pull-Request: golang/go#25976
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/120055
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Use the binary.{Big,Little}Endian integer encoding methods rather
than unsafe or local implementations. These methods are tested to
ensure they inline correctly and don't add unnecessary bounds checks,
so it seems better to use them wherever possible.
This introduces a dependency on encoding/binary to crypto/cipher. I
think this is OK because other "L3" packages already import
encoding/binary.
Change-Id: I5cf01800d08554ca364e46cfc1d9445cf3c711a0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/115555
Run-TryBot: Michael Munday <mike.munday@ibm.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Avoid using package specific variables when there is a one to one
correspondance to cpu feature support exported by internal/cpu.
This makes it clearer which cpu feature is referenced.
Another advantage is that internal/cpu variables are padded to avoid
false sharing and memory and cache usage is shared by multiple packages.
Change-Id: If18fb448a95207cfa6a3376f3b2ddc4b230dd138
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/126596
Run-TryBot: Martin Möhrmann <moehrmann@google.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
The existing implementation of TLS connection has a deadlock. It occurs
when client connects to TLS server and doesn't send data for
handshake, so server calls Close on this connection. This is because
server reads data under locked mutex, while Close method tries to
lock the same mutex.
Fixes#23518
Change-Id: I4fb0a2a770f3d911036bfd9a7da7cc41c1b27e19
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/90155
Run-TryBot: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
Use the dedicated AES* and PMULL* instructions to accelerate AES-GCM
name old time/op new time/op delta
AESGCMSeal1K-46 12.1µs ± 0% 0.9µs ± 0% -92.66% (p=0.000 n=9+10)
AESGCMOpen1K-46 12.1µs ± 0% 0.9µs ± 0% -92.43% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
AESGCMSign8K-46 58.6µs ± 0% 2.1µs ± 0% -96.41% (p=0.000 n=9+8)
AESGCMSeal8K-46 92.8µs ± 0% 5.7µs ± 0% -93.86% (p=0.000 n=9+9)
AESGCMOpen8K-46 92.9µs ± 0% 5.7µs ± 0% -93.84% (p=0.000 n=8+9)
name old speed new speed delta
AESGCMSeal1K-46 84.7MB/s ± 0% 1153.4MB/s ± 0% +1262.21% (p=0.000 n=9+10)
AESGCMOpen1K-46 84.4MB/s ± 0% 1115.2MB/s ± 0% +1220.53% (p=0.000 n=10+10)
AESGCMSign8K-46 140MB/s ± 0% 3894MB/s ± 0% +2687.50% (p=0.000 n=9+10)
AESGCMSeal8K-46 88.2MB/s ± 0% 1437.5MB/s ± 0% +1529.30% (p=0.000 n=9+9)
AESGCMOpen8K-46 88.2MB/s ± 0% 1430.5MB/s ± 0% +1522.01% (p=0.000 n=8+9)
This change mirrors the current amd64 implementation, and provides optimal performance
on a range of arm64 processors including Centriq 2400 and Apple A12. By and large it is
implicitly tested by the robustness of the already existing amd64 implementation.
The implementation interleaves GHASH with CTR mode to achieve the highest possible
throughput, it also aggregates GHASH with a factor of 8, to decrease the cost of the
reduction step.
Even thought there is a significant amount of assembly, the code reuses the go
code for the amd64 implementation, so there is little additional go code.
Since AES-GCM is critical for performance of all web servers, this change is
required to level the playfield for arm64 CPUs, where amd64 currently enjoys an
unfair advantage.
Ideally both amd64 and arm64 codepaths could be replaced by hypothetical AES and
CLMUL intrinsics, with a few additional vector instructions.
Fixes#18498Fixes#19840
Change-Id: Icc57b868cd1f67ac695c1ac163a8e215f74c7910
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/107298
Run-TryBot: Vlad Krasnov <vlad@cloudflare.com>
TryBot-Result: Gobot Gobot <gobot@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
When x509ignoreCN=1 is present in GODEBUG, ignore the deprecated Common
Name field. This will let people test a behavior we might make the
default in the future, and lets a final class of certificates avoid the
NameConstraintsWithoutSANs error.
Updates #24151
Change-Id: I1c397aa1fa23777b9251c311d02558f9a5bdefc0
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/123695
Reviewed-by: Brad Fitzpatrick <bradfitz@golang.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@golang.org>
