go/src/pkg/crypto/tls/handshake_server.go

// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

package tls

// The handshake goroutine reads handshake messages from the record processor
// and outputs messages to be written on another channel. It updates the record
// processor with the state of the connection via the control channel. In the
// case of handshake messages that need synchronous processing (because they
// affect the handling of the next record) the record processor knows about
// them and either waits for a control message (Finished) or includes a reply
// channel in the message (ChangeCipherSpec).

import (
	"crypto/hmac"
	"crypto/rc4"
	"crypto/rsa"
	"crypto/sha1"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"crypto/x509"
	"io"
	"os"
)

type cipherSuite struct {
	id                          uint16 // The number of this suite on the wire.
	hashLength, cipherKeyLength int
	// TODO(agl): need a method to create the cipher and hash interfaces.
}

var cipherSuites = []cipherSuite{
	cipherSuite{TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 20, 16},
}

func (c *Conn) serverHandshake() os.Error {
	config := c.config
	msg, err := c.readHandshake()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	clientHello, ok := msg.(*clientHelloMsg)
	if !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}
	vers, ok := mutualVersion(clientHello.vers)
	if !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertProtocolVersion)
	}
	c.vers = vers
	c.haveVers = true

	finishedHash := newFinishedHash()
	finishedHash.Write(clientHello.marshal())

	hello := new(serverHelloMsg)

	// We only support a single ciphersuite so we look for it in the list
	// of client supported suites.
	//
	// TODO(agl): Add additional cipher suites.
	var suite *cipherSuite

	for _, id := range clientHello.cipherSuites {
		for _, supported := range cipherSuites {
			if supported.id == id {
				suite = &supported
				break
			}
		}
	}

	foundCompression := false
	// We only support null compression, so check that the client offered it.
	for _, compression := range clientHello.compressionMethods {
		if compression == compressionNone {
			foundCompression = true
			break
		}
	}

	if suite == nil || !foundCompression {
		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
	}

	hello.vers = vers
	hello.cipherSuite = suite.id
	t := uint32(config.Time())
	hello.random = make([]byte, 32)
	hello.random[0] = byte(t >> 24)
	hello.random[1] = byte(t >> 16)
	hello.random[2] = byte(t >> 8)
	hello.random[3] = byte(t)
	_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Rand, hello.random[4:])
	if err != nil {
		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
	}
	hello.compressionMethod = compressionNone
	if clientHello.nextProtoNeg {
		hello.nextProtoNeg = true
		hello.nextProtos = config.NextProtos
	}

	finishedHash.Write(hello.marshal())
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, hello.marshal())

	if len(config.Certificates) == 0 {
		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
	}

	certMsg := new(certificateMsg)
	certMsg.certificates = config.Certificates[0].Certificate
	finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certMsg.marshal())

	if config.AuthenticateClient {
		// Request a client certificate
		certReq := new(certificateRequestMsg)
		certReq.certificateTypes = []byte{certTypeRSASign}
		// An empty list of certificateAuthorities signals to
		// the client that it may send any certificate in response
		// to our request.

		finishedHash.Write(certReq.marshal())
		c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, certReq.marshal())
	}

	helloDone := new(serverHelloDoneMsg)
	finishedHash.Write(helloDone.marshal())
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, helloDone.marshal())

	var pub *rsa.PublicKey
	if config.AuthenticateClient {
		// Get client certificate
		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		certMsg, ok = msg.(*certificateMsg)
		if !ok {
			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
		}
		finishedHash.Write(certMsg.marshal())

		certs := make([]*x509.Certificate, len(certMsg.certificates))
		for i, asn1Data := range certMsg.certificates {
			cert, err := x509.ParseCertificate(asn1Data)
			if err != nil {
				return c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
			}
			certs[i] = cert
		}

		// TODO(agl): do better validation of certs: max path length, name restrictions etc.
		for i := 1; i < len(certs); i++ {
			if err := certs[i-1].CheckSignatureFrom(certs[i]); err != nil {
				return c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
			}
		}

		if len(certs) > 0 {
			key, ok := certs[0].PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
			if !ok {
				return c.sendAlert(alertUnsupportedCertificate)
			}
			pub = key
			c.peerCertificates = certs
		}
	}

	// Get client key exchange
	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	ckx, ok := msg.(*clientKeyExchangeMsg)
	if !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}
	finishedHash.Write(ckx.marshal())

	// If we received a client cert in response to our certificate request message,
	// the client will send us a certificateVerifyMsg immediately after the
	// clientKeyExchangeMsg.  This message is a MD5SHA1 digest of all preceeding
	// handshake-layer messages that is signed using the private key corresponding
	// to the client's certificate. This allows us to verify that the client is in
	// posession of the private key of the certificate.
	if len(c.peerCertificates) > 0 {
		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		certVerify, ok := msg.(*certificateVerifyMsg)
		if !ok {
			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
		}

		digest := make([]byte, 36)
		copy(digest[0:16], finishedHash.serverMD5.Sum())
		copy(digest[16:36], finishedHash.serverSHA1.Sum())
		err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(pub, rsa.HashMD5SHA1, digest, certVerify.signature)
		if err != nil {
			return c.sendAlert(alertBadCertificate)
		}

		finishedHash.Write(certVerify.marshal())
	}

	preMasterSecret := make([]byte, 48)
	_, err = io.ReadFull(config.Rand, preMasterSecret[2:])
	if err != nil {
		return c.sendAlert(alertInternalError)
	}

	err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(config.Rand, config.Certificates[0].PrivateKey, ckx.ciphertext, preMasterSecret)
	if err != nil {
		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
	}
	// We don't check the version number in the premaster secret. For one,
	// by checking it, we would leak information about the validity of the
	// encrypted pre-master secret. Secondly, it provides only a small
	// benefit against a downgrade attack and some implementations send the
	// wrong version anyway. See the discussion at the end of section
	// 7.4.7.1 of RFC 4346.

	masterSecret, clientMAC, serverMAC, clientKey, serverKey :=
		keysFromPreMasterSecret11(preMasterSecret, clientHello.random, hello.random, suite.hashLength, suite.cipherKeyLength)

	cipher, _ := rc4.NewCipher(clientKey)
	c.in.prepareCipherSpec(cipher, hmac.New(sha1.New(), clientMAC))
	c.readRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec)
	if err := c.error(); err != nil {
		return err
	}

	if hello.nextProtoNeg {
		msg, err = c.readHandshake()
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		nextProto, ok := msg.(*nextProtoMsg)
		if !ok {
			return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
		}
		finishedHash.Write(nextProto.marshal())
		c.clientProtocol = nextProto.proto
	}

	msg, err = c.readHandshake()
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}
	clientFinished, ok := msg.(*finishedMsg)
	if !ok {
		return c.sendAlert(alertUnexpectedMessage)
	}

	verify := finishedHash.clientSum(masterSecret)
	if len(verify) != len(clientFinished.verifyData) ||
		subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(verify, clientFinished.verifyData) != 1 {
		return c.sendAlert(alertHandshakeFailure)
	}

	finishedHash.Write(clientFinished.marshal())

	cipher2, _ := rc4.NewCipher(serverKey)
	c.out.prepareCipherSpec(cipher2, hmac.New(sha1.New(), serverMAC))
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeChangeCipherSpec, []byte{1})

	finished := new(finishedMsg)
	finished.verifyData = finishedHash.serverSum(masterSecret)
	c.writeRecord(recordTypeHandshake, finished.marshal())

	c.handshakeComplete = true
	c.cipherSuite = TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA

	return nil
}