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crypto/internal/hpke: add Recipient role

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Adds the Recipient role, alongside the existing Sender role. Also factor
out all of the shared underlying bits and pieces into a shared type that
is embedded in the Sender/Recipient roles.

Change-Id: I7640d8732aa0dd5cc9e38b8c26f0cfa7856170f6
Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/623575
Auto-Submit: Roland Shoemaker <roland@golang.org>
LUCI-TryBot-Result: Go LUCI <golang-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Knyszek <mknyszek@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel McCarney <daniel@binaryparadox.net>
Reviewed-by: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@golang.org>
This commit is contained in:
Roland Shoemaker 2024-08-10 18:19:09 -07:00 committed by Gopher Robot
parent bc1da38c3d
commit afa9880638
2 changed files with 175 additions and 70 deletions
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175
src/crypto/internal/hpke/hpke.go
View File

@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ type hkdfKDF struct {
hash crypto.Hash
}
func (kdf *hkdfKDF) LabeledExtract(suiteID []byte, salt []byte, label string, inputKey []byte) []byte {
labeledIKM := make([]byte, 0, 7+len(suiteID)+len(label)+len(inputKey))
func (kdf *hkdfKDF) LabeledExtract(sid []byte, salt []byte, label string, inputKey []byte) []byte {
labeledIKM := make([]byte, 0, 7+len(sid)+len(label)+len(inputKey))
labeledIKM = append(labeledIKM, []byte("HPKE-v1")...)
labeledIKM = append(labeledIKM, suiteID...)
labeledIKM = append(labeledIKM, sid...)
labeledIKM = append(labeledIKM, label...)
labeledIKM = append(labeledIKM, inputKey...)
return hkdf.Extract(kdf.hash.New, labeledIKM, salt)
@ -59,13 +59,17 @@ type dhKEM struct {
nSecret uint16
}
type KemID uint16
const DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 = 0x0020
var SupportedKEMs = map[uint16]struct {
curve ecdh.Curve
hash crypto.Hash
nSecret uint16
}{
// RFC 9180 Section 7.1
0x0020: {ecdh.X25519(), crypto.SHA256, 32},
DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256: {ecdh.X25519(), crypto.SHA256, 32},
}
func newDHKem(kemID uint16) (*dhKEM, error) {
@ -108,9 +112,22 @@ func (dh *dhKEM) Encap(pubRecipient *ecdh.PublicKey) (sharedSecret []byte, encap
return dh.ExtractAndExpand(dhVal, kemContext), encPubEph, nil
}
type Sender struct {
func (dh *dhKEM) Decap(encPubEph []byte, secRecipient *ecdh.PrivateKey) ([]byte, error) {
pubEph, err := dh.dh.NewPublicKey(encPubEph)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
dhVal, err := secRecipient.ECDH(pubEph)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
kemContext := append(encPubEph, secRecipient.PublicKey().Bytes()...)
return dh.ExtractAndExpand(dhVal, kemContext), nil
}
type context struct {
aead cipher.AEAD
kem *dhKEM
sharedSecret []byte
@ -123,6 +140,14 @@ type Sender struct {
seqNum uint128
}
type Sender struct {
*context
}
type Receipient struct {
*context
}
var aesGCMNew = func(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
if err != nil {
@ -131,97 +156,143 @@ var aesGCMNew = func(key []byte) (cipher.AEAD, error) {
return cipher.NewGCM(block)
}
type AEADID uint16
const (
AEAD_AES_128_GCM = 0x0001
AEAD_AES_256_GCM = 0x0002
AEAD_ChaCha20Poly1305 = 0x0003
)
var SupportedAEADs = map[uint16]struct {
keySize int
nonceSize int
aead func([]byte) (cipher.AEAD, error)
}{
// RFC 9180, Section 7.3
0x0001: {keySize: 16, nonceSize: 12, aead: aesGCMNew},
0x0002: {keySize: 32, nonceSize: 12, aead: aesGCMNew},
0x0003: {keySize: chacha20poly1305.KeySize, nonceSize: chacha20poly1305.NonceSize, aead: chacha20poly1305.New},
AEAD_AES_128_GCM: {keySize: 16, nonceSize: 12, aead: aesGCMNew},
AEAD_AES_256_GCM: {keySize: 32, nonceSize: 12, aead: aesGCMNew},
AEAD_ChaCha20Poly1305: {keySize: chacha20poly1305.KeySize, nonceSize: chacha20poly1305.NonceSize, aead: chacha20poly1305.New},
}
type KDFID uint16
const KDF_HKDF_SHA256 = 0x0001
var SupportedKDFs = map[uint16]func() *hkdfKDF{
// RFC 9180, Section 7.2
0x0001: func() *hkdfKDF { return &hkdfKDF{crypto.SHA256} },
KDF_HKDF_SHA256: func() *hkdfKDF { return &hkdfKDF{crypto.SHA256} },
}
func SetupSender(kemID, kdfID, aeadID uint16, pub crypto.PublicKey, info []byte) ([]byte, *Sender, error) {
suiteID := SuiteID(kemID, kdfID, aeadID)
kem, err := newDHKem(kemID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
pubRecipient, ok := pub.(*ecdh.PublicKey)
if !ok {
return nil, nil, errors.New("incorrect public key type")
}
sharedSecret, encapsulatedKey, err := kem.Encap(pubRecipient)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
func newContext(sharedSecret []byte, kemID, kdfID, aeadID uint16, info []byte) (*context, error) {
sid := suiteID(kemID, kdfID, aeadID)
kdfInit, ok := SupportedKDFs[kdfID]
if !ok {
return nil, nil, errors.New("unsupported KDF id")
return nil, errors.New("unsupported KDF id")
}
kdf := kdfInit()
aeadInfo, ok := SupportedAEADs[aeadID]
if !ok {
return nil, nil, errors.New("unsupported AEAD id")
return nil, errors.New("unsupported AEAD id")
}
pskIDHash := kdf.LabeledExtract(suiteID, nil, "psk_id_hash", nil)
infoHash := kdf.LabeledExtract(suiteID, nil, "info_hash", info)
pskIDHash := kdf.LabeledExtract(sid, nil, "psk_id_hash", nil)
infoHash := kdf.LabeledExtract(sid, nil, "info_hash", info)
ksContext := append([]byte{0}, pskIDHash...)
ksContext = append(ksContext, infoHash...)
secret := kdf.LabeledExtract(suiteID, sharedSecret, "secret", nil)
secret := kdf.LabeledExtract(sid, sharedSecret, "secret", nil)
key := kdf.LabeledExpand(suiteID, secret, "key", ksContext, uint16(aeadInfo.keySize) /* Nk - key size for AEAD */)
baseNonce := kdf.LabeledExpand(suiteID, secret, "base_nonce", ksContext, uint16(aeadInfo.nonceSize) /* Nn - nonce size for AEAD */)
exporterSecret := kdf.LabeledExpand(suiteID, secret, "exp", ksContext, uint16(kdf.hash.Size()) /* Nh - hash output size of the kdf*/)
key := kdf.LabeledExpand(sid, secret, "key", ksContext, uint16(aeadInfo.keySize) /* Nk - key size for AEAD */)
baseNonce := kdf.LabeledExpand(sid, secret, "base_nonce", ksContext, uint16(aeadInfo.nonceSize) /* Nn - nonce size for AEAD */)
exporterSecret := kdf.LabeledExpand(sid, secret, "exp", ksContext, uint16(kdf.hash.Size()) /* Nh - hash output size of the kdf*/)
aead, err := aeadInfo.aead(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
return nil, err
}
return encapsulatedKey, &Sender{
kem: kem,
return &context{
aead: aead,
sharedSecret: sharedSecret,
suiteID: suiteID,
suiteID: sid,
key: key,
baseNonce: baseNonce,
exporterSecret: exporterSecret,
}, nil
}
func (s *Sender) nextNonce() []byte {
nonce := s.seqNum.bytes()[16-s.aead.NonceSize():]
for i := range s.baseNonce {
nonce[i] ^= s.baseNonce[i]
func SetupSender(kemID, kdfID, aeadID uint16, pub *ecdh.PublicKey, info []byte) ([]byte, *Sender, error) {
kem, err := newDHKem(kemID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
// Message limit is, according to the RFC, 2^95+1, which
// is somewhat confusing, but we do as we're told.
if s.seqNum.bitLen() >= (s.aead.NonceSize()*8)-1 {
panic("message limit reached")
sharedSecret, encapsulatedKey, err := kem.Encap(pub)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
context, err := newContext(sharedSecret, kemID, kdfID, aeadID, info)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return encapsulatedKey, &Sender{context}, nil
}
func SetupReceipient(kemID, kdfID, aeadID uint16, priv *ecdh.PrivateKey, info, encPubEph []byte) (*Receipient, error) {
kem, err := newDHKem(kemID)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sharedSecret, err := kem.Decap(encPubEph, priv)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
context, err := newContext(sharedSecret, kemID, kdfID, aeadID, info)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &Receipient{context}, nil
}
func (ctx *context) nextNonce() []byte {
nonce := ctx.seqNum.bytes()[16-ctx.aead.NonceSize():]
for i := range ctx.baseNonce {
nonce[i] ^= ctx.baseNonce[i]
}
s.seqNum = s.seqNum.addOne()
return nonce
}
func (s *Sender) Seal(aad, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
func (ctx *context) incrementNonce() {
// Message limit is, according to the RFC, 2^95+1, which
// is somewhat confusing, but we do as we're told.
if ctx.seqNum.bitLen() >= (ctx.aead.NonceSize()*8)-1 {
panic("message limit reached")
}
ctx.seqNum = ctx.seqNum.addOne()
}
func (s *Sender) Seal(aad, plaintext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
ciphertext := s.aead.Seal(nil, s.nextNonce(), plaintext, aad)
s.incrementNonce()
return ciphertext, nil
}
func SuiteID(kemID, kdfID, aeadID uint16) []byte {
func (r *Receipient) Open(aad, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
plaintext, err := r.aead.Open(nil, r.nextNonce(), ciphertext, aad)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
r.incrementNonce()
return plaintext, nil
}
func suiteID(kemID, kdfID, aeadID uint16) []byte {
suiteID := make([]byte, 0, 4+2+2+2)
suiteID = append(suiteID, []byte("HPKE")...)
suiteID = byteorder.BeAppendUint16(suiteID, kemID)
@ -238,6 +309,14 @@ func ParseHPKEPublicKey(kemID uint16, bytes []byte) (*ecdh.PublicKey, error) {
return kemInfo.curve.NewPublicKey(bytes)
}
func ParseHPKEPrivateKey(kemID uint16, bytes []byte) (*ecdh.PrivateKey, error) {
kemInfo, ok := SupportedKEMs[kemID]
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("unsupported KEM id")
}
return kemInfo.curve.NewPrivateKey(bytes)
}
type uint128 struct {
hi, lo uint64
}

70
src/crypto/internal/hpke/hpke_test.go
View File

@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ func TestRFC9180Vectors(t *testing.T) {
}
t.Cleanup(func() { testingOnlyGenerateKey = nil })
encap, context, err := SetupSender(
encap, sender, err := SetupSender(
uint16(kemID),
uint16(kdfID),
uint16(aeadID),
@ -119,21 +119,42 @@ func TestRFC9180Vectors(t *testing.T) {
if !bytes.Equal(encap, expectedEncap) {
t.Errorf("unexpected encapsulated key, got: %x, want %x", encap, expectedEncap)
}
expectedSharedSecret := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["shared_secret"])
if !bytes.Equal(context.sharedSecret, expectedSharedSecret) {
t.Errorf("unexpected shared secret, got: %x, want %x", context.sharedSecret, expectedSharedSecret)
privKeyBytes := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["skRm"])
priv, err := ParseHPKEPrivateKey(uint16(kemID), privKeyBytes)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
expectedKey := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["key"])
if !bytes.Equal(context.key, expectedKey) {
t.Errorf("unexpected key, got: %x, want %x", context.key, expectedKey)
receipient, err := SetupReceipient(
uint16(kemID),
uint16(kdfID),
uint16(aeadID),
priv,
info,
encap,
)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
expectedBaseNonce := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["base_nonce"])
if !bytes.Equal(context.baseNonce, expectedBaseNonce) {
t.Errorf("unexpected base nonce, got: %x, want %x", context.baseNonce, expectedBaseNonce)
}
expectedExporterSecret := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["exporter_secret"])
if !bytes.Equal(context.exporterSecret, expectedExporterSecret) {
t.Errorf("unexpected exporter secret, got: %x, want %x", context.exporterSecret, expectedExporterSecret)
for _, ctx := range []*context{sender.context, receipient.context} {
expectedSharedSecret := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["shared_secret"])
if !bytes.Equal(ctx.sharedSecret, expectedSharedSecret) {
t.Errorf("unexpected shared secret, got: %x, want %x", ctx.sharedSecret, expectedSharedSecret)
}
expectedKey := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["key"])
if !bytes.Equal(ctx.key, expectedKey) {
t.Errorf("unexpected key, got: %x, want %x", ctx.key, expectedKey)
}
expectedBaseNonce := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["base_nonce"])
if !bytes.Equal(ctx.baseNonce, expectedBaseNonce) {
t.Errorf("unexpected base nonce, got: %x, want %x", ctx.baseNonce, expectedBaseNonce)
}
expectedExporterSecret := mustDecodeHex(t, setup["exporter_secret"])
if !bytes.Equal(ctx.exporterSecret, expectedExporterSecret) {
t.Errorf("unexpected exporter secret, got: %x, want %x", ctx.exporterSecret, expectedExporterSecret)
}
}
for _, enc := range parseVectorEncryptions(vector.Encryptions) {
@ -142,26 +163,31 @@ func TestRFC9180Vectors(t *testing.T) {
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
context.seqNum = uint128{lo: uint64(seqNum)}
sender.seqNum = uint128{lo: uint64(seqNum)}
receipient.seqNum = uint128{lo: uint64(seqNum)}
expectedNonce := mustDecodeHex(t, enc["nonce"])
// We can't call nextNonce, because it increments the sequence number,
// so just compute it directly.
computedNonce := context.seqNum.bytes()[16-context.aead.NonceSize():]
for i := range context.baseNonce {
computedNonce[i] ^= context.baseNonce[i]
}
computedNonce := sender.nextNonce()
if !bytes.Equal(computedNonce, expectedNonce) {
t.Errorf("unexpected nonce: got %x, want %x", computedNonce, expectedNonce)
}
expectedCiphertext := mustDecodeHex(t, enc["ct"])
ciphertext, err := context.Seal(mustDecodeHex(t, enc["aad"]), mustDecodeHex(t, enc["pt"]))
ciphertext, err := sender.Seal(mustDecodeHex(t, enc["aad"]), mustDecodeHex(t, enc["pt"]))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(ciphertext, expectedCiphertext) {
t.Errorf("unexpected ciphertext: got %x want %x", ciphertext, expectedCiphertext)
}
expectedPlaintext := mustDecodeHex(t, enc["pt"])
plaintext, err := receipient.Open(mustDecodeHex(t, enc["aad"]), mustDecodeHex(t, enc["ct"]))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !bytes.Equal(plaintext, expectedPlaintext) {
t.Errorf("unexpected plaintext: got %x want %x", plaintext, expectedPlaintext)
}
})
}
})