diff --git a/src/crypto/internal/fips/aes/gcm/gcm_nonces.go b/src/crypto/internal/fips/aes/gcm/gcm_nonces.go
index 3dc02ac07a3..2d3164033ad 100644
--- a/src/crypto/internal/fips/aes/gcm/gcm_nonces.go
+++ b/src/crypto/internal/fips/aes/gcm/gcm_nonces.go
@@ -5,8 +5,11 @@
 package gcm
 
 import (
+	"crypto/internal/fips/aes"
 	"crypto/internal/fips/alias"
 	"crypto/internal/fips/drbg"
+	"internal/byteorder"
+	"math"
 )
 
 // SealWithRandomNonce encrypts plaintext to out, and writes a random nonce to
@@ -36,3 +39,98 @@ func SealWithRandomNonce(g *GCM, nonce, out, plaintext, additionalData []byte) {
 	drbg.Read(nonce)
 	seal(out, g, nonce, plaintext, additionalData)
 }
+
+// NewGCMForTLS12 returns a new AEAD that works like GCM, but enforces the
+// construction of nonces as specified in RFC 5288, Section 3 and RFC 9325,
+// Section 7.2.1.
+//
+// This complies with FIPS 140-3 IG C.H Resolution 1.a.
+func NewGCMForTLS12(cipher *aes.Block) (*GCMForTLS12, error) {
+	g, err := newGCM(&GCM{}, cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize, gcmTagSize)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &GCMForTLS12{g: *g}, nil
+}
+
+type GCMForTLS12 struct {
+	g    GCM
+	next uint64
+}
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS12) NonceSize() int { return gcmStandardNonceSize }
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS12) Overhead() int { return gcmTagSize }
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS12) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != gcmStandardNonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+
+	counter := byteorder.BeUint64(nonce[len(nonce)-8:])
+
+	// Ensure the counter is monotonically increasing.
+	if counter == math.MaxUint64 {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: counter wrapped")
+	}
+	if counter < g.next {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: counter decreased")
+	}
+	g.next = counter + 1
+
+	return g.g.Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data)
+}
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS12) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	return g.g.Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data)
+}
+
+// NewGCMForTLS13 returns a new AEAD that works like GCM, but enforces the
+// construction of nonces as specified in RFC 8446, Section 5.3.
+func NewGCMForTLS13(cipher *aes.Block) (*GCMForTLS13, error) {
+	g, err := newGCM(&GCM{}, cipher, gcmStandardNonceSize, gcmTagSize)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	return &GCMForTLS13{g: *g}, nil
+}
+
+type GCMForTLS13 struct {
+	g     GCM
+	ready bool
+	mask  uint64
+	next  uint64
+}
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS13) NonceSize() int { return gcmStandardNonceSize }
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS13) Overhead() int { return gcmTagSize }
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS13) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte {
+	if len(nonce) != gcmStandardNonceSize {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM")
+	}
+
+	counter := byteorder.BeUint64(nonce[len(nonce)-8:])
+	if !g.ready {
+		// In the first call, the counter is zero, so we learn the XOR mask.
+		g.ready = true
+		g.mask = counter
+	}
+	counter ^= g.mask
+
+	// Ensure the counter is monotonically increasing.
+	if counter == math.MaxUint64 {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: counter wrapped")
+	}
+	if counter < g.next {
+		panic("crypto/cipher: counter decreased")
+	}
+	g.next = counter + 1
+
+	return g.g.Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data)
+}
+
+func (g *GCMForTLS13) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) {
+	return g.g.Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data)
+}
diff --git a/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go b/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go
index ec867ceab0a..1c849e3c274 100644
--- a/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go
+++ b/src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ import (
 	"crypto/des"
 	"crypto/hmac"
 	"crypto/internal/boring"
+	fipsaes "crypto/internal/fips/aes"
+	"crypto/internal/fips/aes/gcm"
 	"crypto/rc4"
 	"crypto/sha1"
 	"crypto/sha256"
@@ -521,7 +523,7 @@ func aeadAESGCM(key, noncePrefix []byte) aead {
 		aead, err = boring.NewGCMTLS(aes)
 	} else {
 		boring.Unreachable()
-		aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+		aead, err = gcm.NewGCMForTLS12(aes.(*fipsaes.Block))
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err)
@@ -555,7 +557,7 @@ func aeadAESGCMTLS13(key, nonceMask []byte) aead {
 		aead, err = boring.NewGCMTLS13(aes)
 	} else {
 		boring.Unreachable()
-		aead, err = cipher.NewGCM(aes)
+		aead, err = gcm.NewGCMForTLS13(aes.(*fipsaes.Block))
 	}
 	if err != nil {
 		panic(err)