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crypto/rsa: change public exponent from 3 to 65537
Although there's still no concrete security reason not to use 3, I think Bleichenbacher has convinced me that it's a useful defense and it's what everyone else does. R=bradfitz, rsc CC=golang-dev https://golang.org/cl/5307060
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@ -116,15 +116,7 @@ func GenerateKey(random io.Reader, bits int) (priv *PrivateKey, err os.Error) {
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// [2] http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/techreports/2006/cacr2006-16.pdf
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func GenerateMultiPrimeKey(random io.Reader, nprimes int, bits int) (priv *PrivateKey, err os.Error) {
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priv = new(PrivateKey)
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// Smaller public exponents lead to faster public key
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// operations. Since the exponent must be coprime to
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// (p-1)(q-1), the smallest possible value is 3. Some have
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// suggested that a larger exponent (often 2**16+1) be used
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// since previous implementation bugs[1] were avoided when this
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// was the case. However, there are no current reasons not to use
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// small exponents.
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// [1] http://marc.info/?l=cryptography&m=115694833312008&w=2
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priv.E = 3
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priv.E = 65537
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if nprimes < 2 {
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return nil, os.NewError("rsa.GenerateMultiPrimeKey: nprimes must be >= 2")
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